EDITORIAL STAFF
David Godshalk, editor
Mary Campbell Stewart, editor
Sara Grove, associate editor
Marcia Guild Gibbs, managing editor
William Smith, photography editor
Angelo Costanzo, editor emeritus
Cynthia A. Botteron, review editor
Richard Zumkhaiwala-Cook, review editor

EDITORIAL BOARD
H. James Birx
   Canisius College
Harry M. Buck
   Wilson College
Dan T. Carter
   University of South Carolina
Valerie Ceddia
   Fayetteville, Pennsylvania
O. R. Dathorne
   University of Kentucky
Terry DiDomenico
   Shippensburg University
Don H. Doyle
   University of South Carolina
Henry Louis Gates Jr.
   Harvard University
Glenda Gilmore
   Yale University
Shelley Gross-Gray
   Shippensburg University
Scot Guenter
   San Jose State University
Donald L. Henry
   Shepherd University
Stephen Kantrowitz
   University of Wisconsin–Madison
Mary Karasch
   Oakland University
Linda Smosky
   Wingate, North Carolina
Marjorie J. Spruill
   University of South Carolina

REVIEW COMMITTEE
Kwabena Akurang-Parry
Michael Applegarth
Julie Bao
Nielsen Brasher
Brendan Finucane
Deborah Francis
Agnes Ragone
Robert Shaffer
Jonathan Skaff
Robert Stephens

ADVISORY EDITORS
Matthew Haar Farris
   University of California, Berkeley
David Gordon
   Shepherd University
John Reid Jones
   Delta State University
Joy Kroeger-Mappes
   Frostburg State University
Douglas Reichert Powell
   Columbia College Chicago
Pegeen Reichart Powell
   Aurora University

and from Shippensburg University

MEMBER

Council of Editors of Learned Journals
# Table of Contents

Introduction  
*Globalization Meets Everyday Life*  
Cynthia A. Botteron and Richard Zumkhawala-Cook  
vii

*Suppose Everything Lasted like Electrolux: Hybridity and Resistance in Viet Nam*  
Charles Waugh  
1

*Insular Utopias and Religious Neuroses: Hybridity Anxiety in Zadie Smith’s White Teeth*  
Elaine Childs  
7

*The Costs of Going Global: The Cases of Shanghai and Bangkok*  
Robert W. Duff and Lawrence K. Hong  
13

*Globalization and Higher Education: Challenge or Peril?*  
Robert H. Craig  
22

*All about the Bean: The Globalization and International Trade of Coffea*  
David C. Johnson  
29

*Ezra Pound’s Seven Lakes*  
Jianqing Zheng  
34

*Is Neo-Liberalism Bad for Women?*  
Nandini Deo  
35
An ancient Greek sea divinity, herdsman of seals, Proteus could be elusive by changing his form at will to appear as a lion, a serpent, a boar, water, or a tall tree. However, when those who caught him succeeded in holding him fast, Proteus assumed his proper shape of an old man and told the truth.
Globalization, in short, can be thought of as the widening, intensifying, speeding up, and growing impact of world-wide interconnectedness….Globalization…[represents] a shift or transformation in the scale of human social organization that extends the reach of power relations across the world’s major regions and continents. It implies a world in which development in one region can come to shape the life chances of communities in distant parts of the globe. Highly uneven in its impact, it divides as it integrates….Political communities are in the process of being transformed. At the heart of this lies a growth in transborder political issues and problems which erode clear cut distinctions between domestic and foreign affairs, internal political issues and external questions, the sovereign concerns of the nation-state and international considerations.

—David Held and Anthony McGrew

As our editorial board prepared this issue of Proteus, we marveled at the wide range of definitions our authors offered for the term globalization and the sheer diversity of topics explored in their submissions. This experience underscored the growing presence of globalization in our public discourse and the multiplicity of its meanings and connotations. Journalists have employed the term to describe everything from the proliferation of Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurants in Asia to the emergence of worldwide terrorist networks, from the melding of Eastern and Western popular musical forms to the integration of the European Union. Commentators have alternately portrayed globalization as a tool for political liberation and a mechanism for economic and racial oppression.

The rise of these phenomena reflects a much broader increase since the 1980s in the number of linkages spanning the globe and an extraordinary magnification of their strength and power. As David Held and Anthony McGrew (2001) remind us, globalization does not represent a rupture from the past so much as an intensification of long-standing processes. International trade networks and cultural exchanges have been expanding for millennia despite intermittent periods of retraction. Religious, ethnic, and social groups have, since time immemorial, woven and maintained social webs that crisscross the territorial boundaries of kingdoms and states. Nationalism and the modern nation state, whose primacy globalization threatens, are themselves relatively modern inventions.

The engines of globalization, social thinkers generally agree, have been the worldwide expansion of free-market capitalism since the early 1990s and the proliferation of advanced communication technologies. These new technologies have lowered the cost of international telephone calls and facilitated the rise of e-mail, the Internet, and new electronic exchanges that coordinate the global trade of commodities, currencies, stocks, bonds, and financial services. The international marketplace opens up new possibilities for economic growth among many nations, corporations, and individuals who participate in it. Investors, international trade agreements, and international agencies (particularly the International Monetary Fund), are exerting pressure on country after country to adopt the “golden rules” of international commerce:

- maintaining a low rate of inflation and price stability, shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, maintaining as close to a balanced budget as possible,…
- eliminating and lowering tariffs on imported goods, removing restrictions on foreign investment…increasing exports, privatizing state-owned industries and utilities,…
- [and] deregulating its economy to promote as much domestic trade as possible. (Friedman 2000, 105)

As the sole superpower and home base for many of the world’s largest corporations and financial institutions, the United States government plays a central role in promoting the ideals of trade liberalization and in enforcing trade agreements and international patent laws. Many proponents portray free-market capitalism as a force for human progress and enhanced individual opportunity. The dynamic ability of trade and commercialism to generate wealth can potentially challenge traditional hierarchies in highly stratified societies.

In contrast, critics of unbridled free trade argue that multinational corporations and international investors have repeatedly operated within and shored up oppressive governments. According to BusinessWeek, Google (whose corporate mission is “to organize the world’s information and make it universally accessible and useful”) has joined other international firms in accepting Chinese government mandates to filter out “politically sensitive” search terms, such as “Dalai...
Lama” (Einhorn & Elgin 2006, 32–34). Environmentalists have a wealth of evidence that multinational oil corporations in Nigeria have devastated the Niger Delta’s ecosystem. In addition, corporate representatives have openly admitted offering support to Nigerian government security forces that have murdered civilians. In 1995, spokespersons for locally-based international oil companies failed to denounce the execution of nine indigenous activists for protesting the uncompensated seizure of their homelands.

Although free-market capitalism and the liberalization of markets promote economic growth and the efficient utilization of resources, these economic doctrines fail to address the larger political questions of whom this wealth will benefit or what social purposes it will serve. The marketplace transforms resources, objects, and human labor into commodities to be traded and collected in pursuit of wealth. The rapid economic growth of India, China, and others has dramatically boosted the global utilization of such raw materials as oil, iron ore, and steel.

By linking consumers with distant suppliers on an unprecedented scale, the emergence of global trade networks has generated demands for new commodities and threatened once isolated ecosystems. The fondness of Chinese gourmands for turtle meat has triggered intensive harvesting in the U. S. Chesapeake region, threatening a once healthy terrapin population. America’s demand for NBA professionals has created a global trade in tall Ghanaian adolescents, lining the pockets of ambitious sports agents and entrepreneurs.

In many cases, the profits promised by global trade have encouraged outsiders to appropriate collectively-held land of indigenous peoples and to privatize vital resources such as water. A growing global resistance movement is mobilizing against the efforts of corporations and entrepreneurs to patent medicines and plant species that local populations have developed over several centuries in Brazil, Mexico, and China. Larry Proctor, president of a Colorado seed company, has for nearly six years successfully defended his claim to a patent on a variety of yellow bean. Although the bean was originally developed by Mexicans and is widely grown in the U.S., Proctor has blocked both Mexican and American farmers from selling it in the United States. This case is one of thousands of patent lawsuits currently before the courts. Noting the dramatic rise in patent-infringement cases and the growing tendency among judges to side with patent holders, the Federal Trade Commission has warned that such “questionable patents are a significant competitive threat and can harm innovation” (Surowiecki 2005).

The globalization of trade has dramatically outstripped the ability of international organizations to regulate multinational corporations or address worldwide problems such as global warming, the spread of industrial pollution, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The successful efforts of celebrities like Bono of the band U2 to publicize Africa’s economic and social problems are promising as are Bill and Melinda Gates’s health initiatives. The rise of regional and global Internet and e-mail communities offers hope for exposing injustices and challenging growing threats to the environment. In the early 1990s, for example, the World Trade Organization decreed that American laws seeking to protect dolphins from being trapped in tuna nets represented a restraint on free trade. In response, activists mounted a campaign that pressured grocery store chains to sell only “dolphin safe” tuna. Similar battles against labor abuses in the U.S. and foreign countries have enjoyed limited success. Social scientists question, however, the long-term viability of such strategies. Historically, highly decentralized protest campaigns have proven unsuccessful in forging the close bonds necessary for sustained social movements.

The questions addressed in this issue of Proteus will remain vital in coming decades as globalization continues to accelerate. Economists are heralding the transformation of American and European businesses into “modular” corporations that will outsource almost all their labor tasks to workers in Asia, Latin America, and Central and Eastern Europe. The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that the value of business services outsourced from the U.S. to other countries will eventually multiply by ten (Engardio “Future” 2006, 55–56). One of the world’s most influential business gurus, C. K. Prahalad, warns business leaders that corporations in India, China, and elsewhere are perfecting business models that are exponentially more efficient than their Western counterparts and are discovering new ways to market goods to the poorest members of their societies. Indian entrepreneurs, for example, build sleek, comfortable, safe hotels that charge customers only 20 percent of their multinational counterparts (Engardio “Business” 2006, 68–73). These innovations and America’s escalating trade deficits place new pressures on American corporations and pose additional risks for both its skilled and unskilled workers. The wheels of globalization have only started their spin.

WORKS CITED
INTRODUCTION

GLOBALIZATION MEETS EVERYDAY LIFE

CYNTHIA A. BOTTERON AND RICHARD ZUMKHAWALA-COOK

SHPENNINGSBURG UNIVERSITY

One can probably imagine what the “global village” looks like from a golf course. Wide swaths of lush turf disappear into the manufactured rolling hills of the horizon, water holes that are home to persistent native fauna gently pepper the contours of the manicured fairways, and thick groves of encroaching wilderness lay subdued at the boundaries. Golf courses are nearly always beautiful, luxurious places—monuments honoring the virtues of natural beauty and the human mastery over a landscape designed for extravagant leisure and placid play. If this golf course happens to be in India, as it is for Thomas Friedman at the beginning of his best-selling book, The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century (2005), the scene represents the victories of globalization. On the green, an American journalist stands in awe of the rapid commercialization and economic development that has transformed the physical and cultural terrain of South Asia. Above the golf course itself, high-rise buildings bearing the signatures of multinational capitalism—Hewlett-Packard, Texas Instruments, and Goldman-Sachs—fuel Friedman’s view that the barriers separating the overdeveloped West and underdeveloped nations of the East have finally collapsed. “Aim at either Microsoft or IBM,” instructs his partner at the first tee. Apparently, the global village looks pretty good from a golf course.

Like many supporters of globalization, Friedman’s almost evangelical enthusiasm for a “flat world” refers to a unified global economic structure that, more than ever, links products, services, and information from the remotest regions of the world in flashes of time. CT scans from Johns Hopkins are read via the Internet by radiologists in Bangalore, GAP jeans are manufactured in El Salvador with U.S. cotton, data entry specialists in Beijing are working for businesses in Tokyo, and village farmers in Thailand are using Motorola cell phones. In many ways the world is shrinking. Modern communication and transportation technologies have closed not only geographical distances but have also linked us personally by redefining our collective cultural practices—from the clothes we wear and the food we eat to the technologies that inform and connect us. How we work, learn, communicate, and attribute meaning to our lives have all been profoundly affected by globalization.

On the one hand, it is not hard to see how these processes have been building and accelerating for centuries. Christopher Columbus’s voyage to the new world, after all, was motivated by the promise of new trade routes and new sources of wealth as were the brutal modern European empires that did their fair share of economic, cultural, and human “flattening” wherever they happened to travel. Even in the 19th century, Karl Marx noted that European capitalism was a global project because its internal logic necessitated boundless expansion, new markets, raw products, and new modes of production. On the other hand, relatively new and powerful economic institutions like the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB), controlled almost exclusively by agents from overde-
veloped wealthy Western countries, use their economic and political power to guarantee that global markets follow the rules of “free-market enterprise.” Through a system of surveillance and sanctions, investment and trade agreements from these organizations ensure that a country’s participation in the global market remains true to the logic of profit, growth, and prosperity for some, but with the unfortunate (and theoretically temporary) cost of displacement, loss, and suffering for others.

Despite Friedman’s optimism, most of the world will never be invited to globalization’s 1st tee. Or, as Friedman’s book states, “Much of the world is indeed flat—flat broke” (Bass 2005). Many economists, including Joseph Stiglitz (former World Bank chief economist), have pointed out the increased inequalities and poverty that have accompanied or have even been caused by the policies of globalization and its governance (2005). According to the Associated Press, last year the total wealth of the top 8.3 million people in the world rose by 8.2 percent to $30.8 trillion, a level of prosperity that granted control of 25 percent of the world’s assets to only .13 percent of the population (Powell 2005). Is the flattening effect drawing the world’s citizens together or moving them farther apart?

As a result, globalization is a topic rife with controversy—deep controversy—which begins with trying to precisely define the term itself. Does globalization refer to an integrated global economy, the homogenization of cultural diversity across the globe, the demise of state sovereignty, the ascendancy of a single model of rule, a clash of civilizations along the line of the West and Occident? Or is the entire debate a tempest in a teapot? Before the definition of globalization has been settled, the conversation quickly moves to evaluation. Does it lead to a better standard of living for everyone or for only a few? Should those left behind initially expect to see gains in the near future, the distant future, ever? Is globalization simply a complex economic game whose rules were written to benefit the already powerful? Or are we riding out a wave that we cannot control or predict where, when, or even if it will crash?

However incomplete, naïve, or unwittingly biased, a leap must be taken to continue. For this discussion, globalization means the increasing scale, extent, variety, speed, and magnitude of cross-border social, economic, military, political, and cultural interactions. We also acknowledge that at present, the benefits and costs of globalization are unevenly distributed not only among countries but within them as well. As one critic suggests, “[Globalization] fosters both growing interconnectedness and intensified animosities, driven by the prospect of expanding economic opportunities for some, yet exclusion and marginalization for others” (Krieger 2005, vi).

If the dominant aspect of globalization is interconnectedness and interdependency, it is clear why it receives mixed reviews. After all, when parties come to a table and agree to undertake a joint task, presumably trading some of their autonomy for a perceived good or benefit, should we be surprised that the party who brought the most to the table gains the most? If parties with less to offer at the beginning thought the process would produce egalitarian outcomes, they were either naïve or ignorant about the dynamics of power, or they simply had no choice because it was the only game in town.

It is no surprise, then, that the countries dominating the financial institutions, whose purpose is to integrate the global economy (i.e., the WB, IMF, and WTO), are wildly enthusiastic about the benefits of globalization. The countries who succumb to terms they had little power to set are not so enthusiastic. Indeed, their most positive statement is that the rules of economic integration and trade are probably fair, but powerful countries violate them at will, forcing the poorer countries to labor under them at their increasing disadvantage. Their criticisms are clear: neocolonialism, exploitation, raw national interest, self-interest of the dominant players. This raises the question of why poor nations do not opt out of the system if they see no benefit for themselves. Simply, very few if any have the capacity to exist as autonomous units; that is, most countries rely on other states or global financial institutions for resources they do not have and financing they cannot generate. There is no option and there has not been one for a very long time.

The question raised by the observers of globalization is whether the increasing global integration of economies is weakening the state. Are countries losing control over their economic destinies? There is no simple answer to this question because where you sit on this issue depends on where you stand. If you are the United States, global economic integration has strengthened its position in the world because it is the policy driver for the WB, IMF, and oftentimes the WTO.¹ On the other hand, a number of business sectors in the U.S. are facing tremendous challenges from global competition and have asked for government protection and assistance. One response by business to this leaner and meaner global market has been to off-shore white-collar and manufacturing jobs that are well-paying. This is not a trend U.S. workers have taken with a shrug of the shoulders. It has and will continue to be an issue that features prominently in upcoming elections.

What do we conclude about other global economic powerhouses? More than likely, they are finding globalization a mixed bag as well. China, India, and the European Union are all facing problems of labor dislocation, business-sector development, and capital fluidity. Each one attempts to adjust its financial and
labor policies to take advantage of international market agreements where and when it can while at the same time shielding its national interests. These are the woes of large nations and unions with extensive resources. Poor nations with few resources and underdeveloped financial, political, and technical capacity have little hope to counterbalance or gain against global dynamics that challenge the largest and most powerful. What are the options for economically weaker states? Counter-intuitive perhaps, numerous countries are adopting a strategy of increasing interdependence by forming limited-partner economic trading and finance blocs. Although the European Union is not representative of the poor or necessarily small states, one driving justification for its formation has been to lower trade and financial barriers and hence gain greater control over the regions’ economic destiny—or, in other words, to act as a counterbalance to the United States.

Does the challenge by globalization to a country’s economic sovereignty lead to a growing threat to its political sovereignty as well? In other words, are nations increasingly constrained in setting the course for their domestic policy agenda? If you are a nation whose economic program is shaped by the Washington Consensus, then yes. As a condition of receiving global finance, states must consent to “structural adjustment” programs. This is neoliberal economics in its purest form, which assumes that government is an obstacle to the free-market and that its role in public life must be diminished as much as possible. States must cut their funding for health programs, environmental programs, education, infrastructural development, and so forth. State-owned industries, once thought vital to that country’s interest, must be sold to private owners, and the economy must be opened up to foreign goods, services, and investment. Obviously, a government’s domestic policy agenda is shaped once the commitment has been made to integrate with the global economy. Interestingly, over time the global economic junta began to realize that their programs were serving to undermine the stability of governments trying to faithfully implement the policy. Structural adjustment policies placed tremendous hardship on the backs of those with few resources or margin of comfort to endure radical economic restructuring. For example, when the multinational mega-corporation, Bechtel, tried to privatize water in Bolivia, making it illegal for citizens to even collect rainwater, the public pushed back. They engaged in outspoken and unrelenting resistance, which forced the company to abandon the entire enterprise, subsequently threatening the stability of similar endeavors throughout the region. Global financial institutions and corporations are rethinking this approach. After all, as troublesome as the “state” might be to the operation of a free-market economy, it does provide a few needed services to make the environment safe for capital.

Less straightforward is the lauded growth of global communication through the World Wide Web. Scholars point with glee to the growth of Internet use in China and other nations previously shielded from many of the developments in the world. Ideas, information, and communication flow among people from different nations who would likely never have the opportunity to meet. Governments are clearly nervous about this development and are trying to find mechanisms for either controlling access to the Internet or monitoring what is being read and said. We have to ask why states view this as a threat. Some information and conversations routing through the net are clearly nefarious. Child sex shops in Southeast Asia are more prolific now than ever before because they can more easily market their product. They no longer need rely on word-of-mouth or underground publications; special “vacations” are now only a click and few thousand dollars away. Destructive “technology”—hacking, piracy, and fraud—is easily passed along. And, groups bent on destruction have an easier time maintaining a structure without “structure” through this medium. Putting aside the human penchant for nefarious activity, governments might also be anxious about the exposure of their citizens to a world of life options. Seeing that one’s condition does not have to be the norm can tend to make the oppressed restless and their authoritarian governments nervous.

Whether or not one is subject to a heavy-handed political regime, access to a wide variety of new cultural forms and choices can be a kind of “liberation” for those connected to the global cultural system. It is easy to imagine that cultural differences, once considered impassible, have been smoothed out, if not completely flattened, for easier navigation: an individual in Peoria, Illinois, develops an intimate Internet-mediated relationship with someone from Pretoria, South Africa; a family in London views the latest Bollywood film in Bengali just moments after it has been released to the public in Bombay; a child in Hong Kong prefers McDonald’s cheeseburgers to local cuisine; an ornamental teak chair made in Malaysia arrives in Toronto just two days after it was ordered. The ability to have culture transported (or more accurately, culture’s commodities transported) across time and space with such facility appears to free us from our own mundane and provincial habits. Some have persuasively suggested, however, that what counts as culture in globalization ultimately echoes the economic hierarchies that shape the global marketplace and results in a culturally homogeneous world. It is not only the child in Hong Kong who longs for the Happy Meal but also the child in Singapore, Sydney, Saskatoon, Sao Paulo, and Sarasota. Globalization’s marketplace clearly values some differences more than others. Families in China have been reported to spend over half of their incomes on Western fashions
for their children to ensure their acceptance in the new global village. Workers in Bangalore who already speak English spend years cultivating Midwest accents to serve American phone customers. Indeed, while communicating with people from different cultural backgrounds is easier and faster, and even part of daily business, dozens of our world’s six thousand languages are rendered extinct each year. Perhaps it is not individuals nor cultures that are liberated by globalization but the forms and practices that can be exchanged as capital.

Yet globalization does not necessarily have to describe the process of buying and selling goods and services. Our present information systems reinforce the long understood principle that ideas are contagious and that multitudes across the world have used these accelerated modes of communication for unprecedented networks of democratic “citizen movements.” Technological innovations have facilitated the linking of organizational, strategic, informational, and cooperative efforts to demand economic justice, environmental sustainability, transparent decision-making structures, direct participation, accountable leadership, fair labor standards, adequate health care, and human rights. A popular chant for demonstrators at major WTO or G8 economic summits declares, “the whole world is watching”—referencing not only the immediate event of protest but also the way local politics are linked to global concerns through the uncovering of patterns of repression and injustice. What began as an “anti-globalization” movement in the early 1990s is now positioned as an alternative globalization—one that rejects the capitalist, market-driven version espoused by the WTO, the United States, and the EU. Instead, it is a globalization of practical measures, including fair trade initiatives, grounded in the values of democratic political and economic systems. If the revolution is not televised, maybe it will be streamed over the net.

This issue of *Proteus* contributes to the enormous and necessary challenge of discussing globalization’s ever-changing forms through an interdisciplinary approach. How we talk about globalization and understand its processes undoubtedly shapes the direction of the institutions and practices that propel globalization’s productive forces. In other words, the golf course might only offer a narrow view of the social and economic world. As the selections in this issue demonstrate, we are rapidly developing a global consciousness, but we are far away from a global consensus. With all of its promises and problems, debating, discussion, exploring, and explaining, globalization must be an ongoing and collective effort because the powerful potential of our global system can produce as much devastation and misery as prosperity and hope.

**NOTES**

1 More recently, the WTO has caused the United States and the European Union considerable difficulty on the issues of steel tariffs (U.S.) and farm subsidies that allow their farmers to dump products on the global market at below-market value, hence shutting down small farmers in underdeveloped nations.

2 The Washington Consensus is the policy commitment undertaken by the United States to use the IMF and World Bank to institute liberal economic policies worldwide. These policies push free-market capitalism, smaller government, privatization of state-owned industry, open trade, and foreign investment.

**WORKS CITED**


The ride from Noi Bai International Airport into Ha Noi feels at first like going back in time into another world. Of course, the road is a modern highway, and the cars and trucks are modern too, but the intensely pale green paddy that flanks the road seems to be something dramatically unlike the landscapes of the industrial West. The full weight of the Viet Nam summer sun splatters through the rice shoots, sending ripples of warm virescent light in all directions, washing every other color, every other cultivated acre out of mind. Men and women wearing broad, cone-shaped yellow hats labor—stooping, lifting, sloshing knee-deep in the paddies, using wooden frames and suspended woven baskets to scoop water from one level to the next. Enormous water buffalo pull ancient-looking plows through drained paddy muck so pungent and apparently permanent as to be the primordial ooze itself. But near the city limits, a billboard fitted with electric lights advertises a washer and dryer, registering that despite first appearances, this place is no more pastoral, no more unchanging or antiquarian than any other.

The transition from country to city seems to happen all at once. The occasional streams of traffic coalesce suddenly into a torrent of motorbikes with horns burbling, swishing in and around my van. Tiny three-wheeled trucks with canvas roofs spew gray-blue exhaust, and all of the seven or eight women sitting behind the driver wear elbow-length gloves, field-worker’s hats, sunglasses, and cloth masks covering their mouths and noses for protection. Another silver van competes for space and a few small taxis barge through the crowds, but they are all plodding and outsized in this turbulent stream of flashing spokes.

Narrow, three-or-four-story houses are packed tightly together, close in on the road, channeling the flow of traffic like canyon walls. There are cafés selling snacks and cokes and cigarettes and coffee. Boulder-sized boxes of TVs and washing machines, and smaller ones containing hotplates, microwaves, and all sorts of electric appliances, seem to have tumbled onto the sidewalks where hundreds of bicycles and motor scooters are cast up like so much flotsam. At irregular intervals, huge trees buckle through it all to cast a green canopy over the streets. Women sell produce from baskets, shoulder loads balanced on poles, and keep an eye on their shops while fanning themselves in the shade. Men work in motorbike repair shops, welding an astonishing variety of products right on the sidewalk—sparks flying like blazing decorative plants—and they sell books, haul concrete and bricks, and climb scaffolds at ubiquitous sites of construction. Everywhere there is movement. Activity. An engagement with commerce.

“You should have seen this place five years ago,” a friend said to me between sips of iced lemonade, not

Charles Waugh, Ph.D., is visiting assistant professor of English at Utah State University (Logan) where he teaches courses in creative writing and American studies. He has recently returned from a year at the Viet Nam National University, Ha Noi, where he taught literary, cultural, and environmental U.S. history and delivered the first lectures on ecocriticism in Viet Nam. He is the fiction editor of *Isotope: a journal of literary science and nature writing*, and his work has appeared in the *Wisconsin Review, Knock, Studies in American Fiction*, and *Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment*. 
long after my arrival. “None of these shops existed. None of these bright clothes. Everything everyone had was army green and came from a state-owned shop. Nearly everyone rode bicycles. This private enterprise—this is new.” It all looked like it had been there for ages. The plastic signs above the stores looked like those from strip-mall America circa 1975. The rains had weathered them, making them look old in just a few years. More convincingly, all the bustle looked like that of experience. People knew what they were doing, where they were going.

I wish I could have said the same for myself. I came to Viet Nam after finishing a research project that examined the American nation-builders’ role in 1950s South Viet Nam—an exercise in the history of cultural ignorance and poorly conceived advice. Alongside this interesting, yet depressing work, I exercised my imagination, wondering what Viet Nam was like through learning the language and reading its folktales and myths. Now it was time to see what the real place was like, to see how life worked there. I wanted to soak up whatever I could and to discover whether any of the discouraging past had a bearing on the present. I felt I was teetering atop an immense precipice, waiting for the fog to lift and reveal the world to me.

On my first full day in Ha Noi, I decided to go to the National Art Museum, which on my map didn’t look very far from my guesthouse. The scale was in kilometers, and although I could do the conversion, it was still one of those things I knew in my head, not with my feet. I passed through a section of town near Hoan Kiem Lake containing bookstores, clothing shops, and hotels. There were no shade trees for several blocks on Trang Tien street and the tropical August sun, even at ten in the morning, roasted my hatless skull. I began to see the leftovers of empire—the large buildings built and evacuated by the French and now occupied by ministries of the Vietnamese government, the opera house, an enormous state bank, a huge mansion with a sweeping staircase that was once a colonial residence.

As I walked, I was greeted everywhere by curious smiles and remarks about my height—“Cao quá!”—“Too tall!” I’m six-three and a sitting or squatting or even standing Vietnamese that’s plenty tall enough. I’d spent the summer building houses in Oregon, working daily with no hat under a more forgiving sun, routinely lifting and carrying 125-pound aluminum forms to build concrete foundations, hefting roofing materials up ladders, and pounding nails with a heavy framing hammer. I was as muscular as I’d ever been, weighing over two hundred pounds. Amid so many lithe and compactly agile bodies, I was a hulking monster. I had to be careful walking, not only because the sidewalks were uneven and crowded with people, but also because most of the buildings I passed had been wired for electricity piecemeal by their occupants. Wires crossed from the poles near the streets to the buildings at whatever height seemed appropriate at the time, or more likely at arm’s length. Not paying careful attention, I twice nearly garroted myself.

The mere fact of my walking seemed to elicit a response. After thirty minutes, I realized I had yet to see any other white people on their own two feet. They were all safely tucked inside their air-conditioned vans and SUVs, although every once in a while one would glide by on a motorbike or in the bucket seat of a cyclo, completely detached from the world I was experiencing on the sidewalk. I felt glad to be on the street despite my walk’s being hotter and longer than I anticipated.

I had studied the Vietnamese language intensively for two years but there was no flow yet, no easy dialogue. I ached for some opportunity to interact with those who greeted me, but I seemed only capable of nodding and saying hello. Near the museum, I was sweating profusely and stopped at a café for a cool drink. The husband of the old woman who took my money and brought my nuoc chanh da (water lemon stone)—iced lemonade—pointed me to a chair across the small table from where he sat. He wanted to chat with me in French.

He had a broad face with one bright eye and one clouded behind rectangular glasses. His breath was terrible, passing between the few rotted stumps of his teeth, and when he leaned toward me to help get his meaning across, I had to control my urge to lean back. I had a hard time understanding his heavily Vietnamese-accented French, and as I spoke French only haltingly myself, I responded to him in Vietnamese. He laughed and continued speaking French. I still couldn’t understand. Because I like the sound of the words, I told him in English the capital of Montana is Helena, not Bozeman or Missoula. I asked if he’d ever heard of Tupelo, Mississippi. He laughed. I asked him if he had any interest in Pensacola or Walla Walla. He laughed again and let loose with a long string of French words, I had no idea what he said but he was still grinning so I laughed too and then finished my drink. He shook his hand warmly and in my most careful Vietnamese told him I enjoyed meeting him.

The museum was around the corner, surrounded by a lovely green courtyard and thick yellow walls. I paid my admission at the gatehouse, and from the attendant’s military uniform, I understood that the protecting of the national culture was serious business. The building itself was huge—three stories and seemingly as thickly made as the walls around the courtyard. I suspected that, like the other post-colonial buildings I’d seen, there were ordinary bricks beneath all that
golden yellow-painted stucco, now mossing green or molding brown in spots, and, as with the guard, the vaulted walls made clear that what lay within was of the utmost value.

The ground floor of the museum had four large rooms, each containing works from Viet Nam’s more than two-thousand-year-old history. There were Champan statuettes of dancing women, bucolic lacquer paintings, and some drably colored paintings of Trieu Da, the first emperor of Viet Nam, fighting the invading Han empire during the first two centuries before the Western common era began. There were many images of the Trung sisters, national heroines who led an insurrection that drove the Chinese out of Viet Nam in 40 CE. There were paintings of Emperor Dinh Bo Linh, also fighting the Chinese, and of Le Thanh Tong, the warrior emperor, who had fought valiantly against the Chinese and who established the capitol in Ha Noi nearly a thousand years ago, calling it Thanh Long. In these rooms I found a visual history of a culture of resistance, already eighteen-hundred years old before the first European ever set foot on Vietnamese soil, twenty-one hundred before the first American.

In the upstairs rooms of the museum, I saw one positive effect of French colonial occupation—better paints. Only one room held works from the twentieth century, and despite the new medium, their subject matter remained for the most part the same—pastoral splendor, war heroes and heroines, patient and indomitable resistance. Ignoring the new medium, however, one modern lacquer painting stood out. In it, a figure, all black save for thin red lines representing the shape of one arm, one eye, one eyebrow, and the angle of his nose, sat in one small corner of a large red background, hunched chin on fist over a golden glass. A misfit! Lacquer painting is the most traditional of Vietnamese art forms. Typically, it has a black background and renders an agrarian scene in mother of pearl and is shellacked to a glossy sheen. This artist, Xa Chin, had created the fractured image of a man, placed all the blackness of a traditional lacquer painting background within the figure, and set him small and off center, contemplating a gold cup in the corner of large flat red field. The cup was also flat, making it impossible to tell whether it was empty or full. I stared at the painting for some time, thinking of the possibilities it held.

Homi Bhabha writes frequently of the forms of art that inhabit a Third Space—a place that defies conventional dichotomies such as traditional versus modern, modern versus postmodern, colonizer versus colonized, east versus west. He looks for the art of the interstice, indications that something new, something hybrid is being created by the interplay of cultures.

The hybrid nature of the work, with its citations, imitations, and enigmatic, unreadable canvas that hits the sightline at a peripheral, even anamorphic angle, raises for us the issue of identity and cultural authenticity. (1997, 11)

Had Xa Chin, with a vaguely cubist rendering of the human form—an exchange of exterior blackness for interiority, and the creation of a cup that may hold all or nothing—used Viet Nam’s most traditional medium to make something of a hybrid. The figure is separated from all landscape, all points of reference; the agrarian past has disappeared, and he is left alone to wonder if what is in the golden cup is merely more emptiness or all the material happiness he can imbibe. Yet something, the very medium of his existence, ties him to tradition. Indeed, here, within the art of resistance, is a bridge of hybridity?

I exited the room into the large hallway and turned toward the stairs. At the far end, a little girl sat on a cushioned bench, playing with something that traversed back and forth out of her hand. A small yo-yo? As I approached, I could hear the whirring of her toy, then make out flecks of shiny blue and green iridescence. When I stood before her and smiled, she looked at me and smiled back, her cupped hands clasped tightly together. “What do you have?” I asked in Vietnamese. She giggled. “Please show me, little sister.” She giggled again and then shouted something I couldn’t catch, throwing open her hands to reveal a glittering beetle on a thread tied to her finger. The beetle’s wings hummed and sputtered, holding the bit of space into which it was tossed.

Downstairs, I spent some time in the museum’s gift shop, looking at prints. A man and a woman who appeared to be about my age straightened things, moving in and out of the shop from a back room. The man approached me and said hesitantly in English, “Need something?”

Hesitantly, in Vietnamese, I replied, “No thank you, older brother. I am looking at these pictures—they are very good.”

“You, older brother, speak Vietnamese!”

“A little.”

“You speak very well.”

“Thank you. Still pretty bad though.”

“How old are you? Have you eaten?”

The two quintessentially Vietnamese questions. This was a conversation I could have, the conversation I had been prepared for by all my lessons. The first question is fundamental; it situates the speakers within the social hierarchy. Are you older than me or younger than me? It is the key to conversational Vietnamese because there is no indefinite “you,” only terms of address based on familial and social relationships. The question lets each person know how to address the other, assuming a kind of kinship: Are you my little
brother or my older brother? Are you older than my father or younger so that I should call you younger uncle or older uncle? Are you so old or deserving of respect that I should immediately refer to you as grandfather? How much deference should I show you? You me? If in the odd chance we are equals, we defy all logic and each become the other’s older brother.

“I am twenty-six…”

The second question, equally as common and so simply asked, intersects the Vietnamese culture on multiple planes. It is a question of politeness, of welcoming a visitor, of subconsciously putting into practice the Confucian principle of honoring a guest and seeing to his needs. But the question put to me literally is An com chua? Eaten rice yet? The word for rice is also the generic word for meal or food. The traditional staple of the Vietnamese diet is of course rice; it is the food of subsistence, of survival, of resistance. You will not starve if you have rice. Your guest will not starve if you have rice. You can defend your country for over two thousand years if you have rice. Com binh dan—the food of the people, the rice of the people. Have you eaten?

“…and thank you, older brother, I have eaten. How old are you?”

“I am thirty-two. Why do you, older brother, known Vietnamese?”

Despite our age difference, he had decided we were equals. The whiteness of my skin, the quality of my clothes, the possibility that I might purchase something from his shop, the mere fact that I had enough money to travel from my country to his all meant that I was somehow worthy of his respect. I wanted to be worthy, but the reasons seemed all wrong. “I studied Vietnamese in graduate school but still speak very poorly, Vietnamese in graduate school but still speak very poorly. I studied Vietnamese in graduate school but still speak very poorly. Vietnamese in graduate school but still speak very poorly. Vietnamese in graduate school but still speak very poorly. Vietnamese in graduate school but still speak very poorly. Vietnamese in graduate school but still speak very poorly. Vietnamese in graduate school but still speak very poorly. Vietnamese in graduate school but still speak very badly. I am here to learn more.”

In a measured and clearly articulated voice pitched to my abilities, he told me that he was an artist and that he and his wife earned just enough working in the shop to support their family so that he could continue painting. I told him that I also liked to paint but that I would not yet call myself an artist, which pitched to my abilities, he told me that he was an artist and that he and his wife earned just enough working in the shop to support their family so that he could continue painting. I told him that I also liked to paint but that I would not yet call myself an artist, which made him smile. I was in Ha Noi to try writing for a newspaper. He invited me to have tea with him, but the day was getting on and I was supposed to meet friends for dinner soon, so I thanked him profusely and politely declined. We shook hands and said goodbye. He smiled and told me, “Den tham lai, nhô”—come visit again—the final particle the cajoling “okay?” of a friend.

At dinner that night, the same project partner who had introduced me to nuoc chanh da the night before told me that I should be careful about drinking water that they boil in large aluminum vats in the morning. Other places, however, receive their ice in blocks from places that use water straight out of the tap, and even those who don’t might not boil their water long enough. Freezing doesn’t kill amoebas or giardia. Thinking of my drink with my Frenchnamese-speaking friend, I flushed with stupidity. I should have known better. In the middle of that night, the cramps came first, then diarrhea, cold sweats and shivering, then two full days of the same. Luckily I had antibiotics with me for just such an event. The Vietnamese usually just ride it out, sometimes for a week or more at a time.

The project that brought me to Viet Nam was a sister university project, meant to help make meaningful connections between Americans and Vietnamese, to help heal the wounds of the past through cultural cooperation and understanding. Over the course of a few months, I helped to set up a video library, attended a fascinating weekly seminar given by Dr. Vuong at Viet Nam National University on the anthropological and historical development of Vietnamese culture, conversed with Vietnamese students, and took several trips throughout the country. I copy-edited part time at an English language newspaper where I followed with much interest issues of public administration and development—the subject of my recently completed master’s thesis—and occasionally wrote an article. The intense summer heat dissipated with the arrival of heavier than usual autumn rains, making Ha Noi muggy, then damp, and by winter just plain cold.

In November, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) announced a press conference to unveil a new plan to renovate the public administration system in the Vietnamese government. Using my press credentials, I arranged to attend. They announced a radical reorganization of many government bureaus, consolidations, and other restructurings meant to improve the government’s efficiency. The overhaul included sending selected government officials in the legislative, judicial, and procuratorial divisions abroad to inservice training programs on public administration in Europe and the United States. It also made provisions for the installation of more efficient modes of communication to facilitate faster and more participatory decision-making. The jargon being used was new, but the ideas behind it seemed straight out of the 1950s American public administration mission in South Viet Nam. I couldn’t shake an overwhelming sense of déjà vu.

I sat and watched as the Western journalists in attendance ignored the content of the prepared remarks and demanded to know how any of the changes would curtail the “rampant corruption” in the Vietnamese government. They used these same indignant words over and again as they did in the articles they wrote.
each week. No one interrogated the philosophical or ideological content of the changes, no one seemed to care what any of the changes meant or who was responsible for their origins, but everyone knew that buzzwords make titillating headlines. After the press conference, I sought out the UNDP press officer and arranged for a personal interview the following week with Roy Morey, the UNDP resident representative.

I had heard that Morey was a climber and a Texas blowhard know-nothing and that he would soon be moved up to some important position in New York. But I had also heard from a friend that Morey was a nice guy who believed that he was genuinely committed to doing something good. When I met him in the UNDP building, not far from the museum, he seemed both, projecting himself one size bigger than he was but friendly. He was older than I expected and seemed softer around the edges than when I’d seen him at the press conference, maybe because the crisp suit had been replaced with the kind of seersucker jacket and tie ensemble my grandfather used to wear to church. Morey wasn’t entirely prepared for the kinds of questions I came to ask, tactfully as I tried to put them. I wanted to know how the changes that his office was recommending took into account certain aspects of Vietnamese culture (such as the hierarchies inherent in conversation and what constitutes polite and respectful relationships. Within ten minutes, he had a pained look on his face like he had gas or appendicitis and began fluttering for handouts to give me, saying it wasn’t for the UNDP to cater their advice to the particular features of Vietnamese culture—the Vietnamese could take it or leave it—and anything else I might want to know could be found in the literature. Rustle, rustle. Flutter, flutter. Morey suddenly had an appointment he needed to get to.

So I took a look at “the literature,” the UNDP’s Viet Nam Public Administration Reform Review:

The democratisation of political life in society has important implications for the role and operation of the system of public administration. This development will require a transparent environment which enables people to control the state apparatus. The elected bodies, i.e. National Assembly and People’s Councils, at different levels will have to be strengthened and direct democracy improved at grass-root levels. Consequently, the administrative apparatus has to redefine its role and mode of operation in order to better serve the people and the political bodies. (Dinh et al. 2000, 32)

Apparently the only good public administration is a democratic one after all. Could the UNDP really be telling the Vietnamese government the same things professors from Michigan State University had told the government of South Viet Nam more than forty years before? According to the UNDP literature, promoting democracy is the number one priority, under the assumption that all other reforms—fighting poverty, protecting the rights of women, protecting the environment, etc.—can only be initiated after this first democratic step is taken. A survey of the mission statements of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as well as other documentation, demonstrated that they were also using democratization to describe the parameters within which they would loan money to Viet Nam. In a document that explains the IMF’s strategies for “good governance” (strategies that must be engaged with in some way by the client nation in order to receive favorable reviews and thus monetary assistance), the same democratic principles appear in a subtler form: “staff involvement is more likely to be successful when it strengthens the hands of those in the government seeking to improve governance” (IMF 1997, 233–238). Indeed, here again was the advice of the American public administration professors, forty years later.

Puzzling over the repetitions of this discourse, I was reminded of something anthropologist Arturo Escobar writes in Encountering Development:

The production of the Third World through the articulation of knowledge and power is essential to the development discourse….Even today most people in the West (and in many parts of the Third World) have great difficulty thinking about Third World situations and people in terms other than those provided by the development discourse. These terms—such as overpopulation, the permanent threat of famine, poverty, illiteracy, and the like—operate as the most common signifiers, already stereotyped and burdened with development signifieds. (1995, 12)

Here, in the literature of the World Bank, the IMF, and the UNDP, was the same interweaving of democracy in the discourse of development that the public administration mission from Michigan State brought to Ngo Dinh Diem in 1955. The political situation has changed dramatically but the advice from the West has for the most part remained constant—be like us because democracy is the master key to happiness. When Diem refused to accept advice from the MSU team, from the CIA, and from other Americans, when he adapted what they said to his own political philosophy, when he attempted to fashion a democracy based on Vietnamese social and cultural norms, his resistance led to a deadly coup backed by the United States. Certainly today no one is holding a gun to the head of Viet Nam’s leaders, but what of their resistance? What of their voices?

In the UNDP’s Public Administration Reform Review of Viet Nam, it says

Reform of the public administration has to be based on national historical experience and cultural
Here at least is some room for the Vietnamese to maneuver. The document itself is the product of a team of Western UNDP workers and Vietnamese officials on the Government Steering Committee for Public Administration Reform. In its opening pages it states that “Public administrative reform is seen as a necessary component in the overall renovation process.” The passive voice obscures whether it is the Party Congress and its Government Steering Committee or the UNDP and the IMF and the World Bank who find these reforms to be necessary, but regardless of who demands these changes, the government of Viet Nam has accepted them at some level as long as they are “based on national historical experience and cultural factors.” What’s clear is that even though many of the authors listed on the document are Vietnamese, the language of the reforms is undoubtedly a part of a sixty-year-old Western development discourse. There is a gap here, hopefully one from which something new in culture can develop. If the power of the international agencies seems to have undue influence in Viet Nam, if they seem to be forcing radical changes on Vietnamese culture and governance, we may interpret these documents as Homi Bhabha might: “in the very practice of domination the language of the master becomes hybrid” (1994, 33). How a culture that has arisen from a complex weave of hierarchies (based on kinship and class and age and education and more), that values these hierarchies to the point of using them to determine forms of social address in language, and that derives from a 2000-year-old Confucian tradition of respect for that hierarchical authority will become “democratic” is the sort of milieu for hybrid cultural production Bhabha writes about. The UNDP, the IMF, and the World Bank insist that Viet Nam institute democratic reforms in order to receive their assistance. Through the documents that explain how that will happen, we see that Viet Nam has some opportunity to decide for itself what that democracy will look like.

Yet, the international organizations still retain the ability to approve or deny that assistance; to remain judges, not partners; to be the conservators of political and economic power, not one among various equals. In fact, they themselves have refused to adopt democratic decision-making and retain the bulk of the power and authority for the supposedly democratic but firmly capitalistic powers of the West. It is left entirely to these autocratic groups to decide the extent to which they will accept the Vietnamese cultural production of democracy and allow today for the kinds of hybridizations that were rejected by the United States in 1963.

As I rode my bicycle out of the UNDP compound after the interview, I passed a small fleet of white Land Rovers with the UNDP insignia painted on the doors and exited through the gate, nodding to the guard and noting the strong iron fence that surrounded the building. What lay within that building was obviously well protected, too.

I saw again the bustle, the activity, the stacks of goods flowing from the fronts of the shops. I was in the street, a part of the flow, surrounded on all sides by gleaming, brand-new Honda Dream motorbikes, only this time the novelty had worn off and I felt nauseated by the thick, dark particulates they spewed. I wondered where the money had come from to purchase them, what the terms of credit entailed. I saw billboards advertising cars and TVs and one for washing machines that ironically, considering the staying power of the discourse I’d been thinking about, said in Vietnamese, “Suppose everything lasted like Electrolux.” Further along I saw women who looked older than they probably were squatting in front of their homes scrubbing clothes in a soapy puddle on the sidewalk. I thought of the hours I had spent washing my clothes in a basin, hanging them near my ceiling fan to dry, wishing for the luxury, and at the same time amazed to think of it as such, of a local laundromat. My bowels began to gurgle and I felt the onset of another bout of dysentery, despite my care over the past months. There must be a better way. I felt as I did in the van when I first came to Ha Noi: I was still moving under someone else’s power; I was still watching everything, and waiting.

WORKS CITED
INSULAR UTOPIAS AND RELIGIOUS NEUROSES

HYBRIDITY ANXIETY IN ZADIE SMITH’S *WHITE TEETH*

ELAINE CHILDS

UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE

Well, take Alsana’s sisters—all their children are nothing but trouble. They won’t go to mosque, they don’t pray, they speak strangely, they dress strangely, they eat all kinds of rubbish, they have intercourse with God knows who. No respect for tradition. People call it assimilation when it is nothing but corruption. Corruption! (Smith 2001, 190)

Must the project of our liberationist aesthetics be forever part of a totalizing Utopian vision of Being and History that seeks to transcend the contradictions and ambivalences that constitute the very structure of human subjectivity and its systems of cultural representation? (Bhabha 1994, 29)

Our only recourse is to hang on by our teeth, that is, to have faith and hope, and to love this possibility of an impossible and unmasterable future which is not in our hands. (Caputo 2001, 14)

In 1927, Sigmund Freud wrote in *The Future of an Illusion* that religion is “the universal obsessional neurosis of humanity” (1928, 76). For Freud, living in Europe during those liminal interwar decades, religion was merely a wish fulfillment created in response to humanity’s infantile desire for safety. God, the Great White Father, assures the faithful of a divine plan and rewards in the afterlife so that they might rest in childlike security.

In 2000, Zadie Smith’s character Samad Iqbal remarks in the novel *White Teeth*,

*It is fear. I am fifty-seven, Shiva. When you get to my age, you become…concerned about your faith, you don’t want to leave things too late. I have been corrupted by England—my children, my wife, they too have been corrupted.* (Smith 2001, 144)

Samad lives in the globalizing London of the mid-1980s, and he clings to his Muslim faith as to a life preserver in the riptides of changing cultural identities. Allah, the Great Brown Father, provides cultural security, for “tradition was culture, and culture led to roots, and these were good, these were untainted principles” (193).

Smith calls her novel “a utopian view of race relations. It’s what might be, and what it should be, and maybe what it will be” (Lyall 2000, 8). In *White Teeth*, different cultures and colors do seem, at first, to coexist rather than collide. Archie Jones has a black Jamaican wife and a Bengali best friend, Samad has an affair with his sons’ red-haired English music teacher, and the two men loiter together for two hours a day in O’Connell’s Pool House, which “is an Irish pool house run by Arabs with no pool tables” (Smith 2001, 183). Playgrounds, in this world, are played in by children named Isaac Leung, Danny Rahman, Quang O’Rourke, and Irie Jones (326). Laura Moss sees this multiculturalism in *White Teeth* as evidence that hybridity is becoming “an increasingly ordinary locus in changing postcolonial contexts” (2003, 12, emphasis added) rather than an act of ongoing negotiation in response to increasing cultural diversity as Homi Bhabha envisions it (1994). In spite of this increasing diversity, however, it is clear that not everyone is part
of this alleged utopia of race relations: to name only one example, the pinball machine in O’Connell’s is stained “where Samad first spilt civilian blood, with a hefty right hook to a racist drunk” (Smith 2001, 245). Even O’Connell’s, the most emblematic example of hybridity in the novel, is not safe from racist intrusions. Moreover, hybridity itself is less a utopia than a source of anxiety for many of White Teeth’s characters, particularly those like Samad, who derives a great deal of his personal identity from his connection to one culture, tradition, history, and faith. As he sees it, the symbiotic relationship of multiple cultures reduces the purity and autonomy of one culture; disrupting his culture also disrupts his sense of self.

For Samad, Millat, and Hortense, religion is something to cling to in order to preserve their cultures, histories, and identities in the midst of increasing pluralism. Hardt and Negri write that “Nomadism and miscegenation appear here as figures of virtue, as the first ethical practices on the terrain of Empire” (2000, 362). The newborn ethic of globalization can be threatening to the thick walls of autonomy, whether it is of self, culture, nation, or religion; however, those with an emotional connection to any of these establishments may then see the “virtues” of globalization as sacrileges. This is why Samad, Millat, and Hortense have the circular practice of both defending their religions and being defended by them; both desires result from the ontological insecurity caused by globalization. Bauman writes:

Neo-tribal and fundamentalist tendencies, which reflect and articulate the experience of people on the receiving end of globalization, are as much legitimate offspring of globalization as the widely acclaimed “hybridization” of top culture. (1998, 3)

However, it may be hoped that it is too precipitous a move to consider all impassioned religious affiliations as merely the offspring of and opposition to hybridization or as the refuge of globalization’s oppressed since religion is often affectively tied up with identity. But neither does it seem accurate to assume that hybridity is merely the place where we all now live. Multiculturalism gives rise to both resistance and acceptance, and while White Teeth is no “utopia of race relations,” the novel can lead a reader to imagine a space in which Samad could keep his family together and still be a good Muslim. Hardt and Negri’s new virtues of nomadism and miscegenation cannot be, on their own, functional solutions to the problems confronting globalization and pluralism, at least as long as the nomads are human locations of desire and faith. However, another methodology is available, a broader vision of hybridity as communitas (to use Victor Turner’s vocabulary) in which the value differences in a pluralized space are leveled but différence is not, and devotion to monotheism can be passionate yet still not oppressive to religious others. Paradoxically, this process resuscitates both monotheism and pluralism, for if the liminal, hybrid space might be accepted as purely pedagogical, then faith need no longer be a glass shield between self and the other.

**What Is a Bengali?**

**Globalization and Ontological Insecurity**

Homi Bhabha shares my skepticism of the new virtues of globalization: he writes that nomadism “cannot credibly support a ‘global ethic’ at a time when, according to the most recent estimates, only 3 percent of the world’s population are part of the global migratory flow” (2004, 346). According to Bauman, mobility is a characteristic of the “global elite,” but for those who lack the necessary capital, the effect of globalization is not increased freedom but rather increased containment (1998, 21). Moreover, pluralism and its resulting autonomy anxiety can lead to neo-racism, for as Catarina Kinnvall writes:

Increasing ontological security for one person or group by means of nationalist and religious myths and traumas is thus likely to decrease security for those not included in the nationalist and/or religious discourse. (2004, 763)

Threatened by racism and feeling that pluralism has corrupted his family, Samad tries to shore up his beleaguered sense of self with Islam, family history, and persistent self-characterization as a Bengali in a world of Englishmen. Accosted by Mad Mary, a London street dweller, Samad tells her:

“We are split people. For myself, half of me wishes to sit quietly with my legs crossed, letting the things that are beyond my control wash over me. But the other half wants to fight the holy war. Jihad!” (Smith 2001, 179)

Ultimately Samad makes neither choice, becoming a curmudgeonly old Muslim Bengali, fighting an armchair Jihad. When his wife Alsana sniffs at him that she lives and lets live, Samad’s response is:

“It’s not a matter of letting others live. It is a matter of protecting one’s culture, shielding one’s religion from abuse. Not that you’d know anything about that, naturally. Always too busy with this Hindi brain popcorn to pay attention to your own culture!”

“My own culture? And what is that please?”

“You’re a Bengali. Act like one.”

“And what is a Bengali, husband, please?”

(235–236)

To Samad, he is a Bengali, and that is what is important. Kinnvall writes that “Globalization challenges simple definitions of who we are and where we came from” and “As people feel increasingly uncertain...
about their daily life, the search for security takes on ontological and existential dimensions” (2004, 746). This is where Samad is; a stranger in a strange land, he is caught in a vicious cycle of disrupted cultural identity, ontological insecurity, and existential angst, searching for security in religiously- and culturally-grounded self-definition and the rediscovery of the instability of those identities.

Ownership of The Secret versus a Passion for the Impossible

However, when religion is not about institutionalism, it does not have to be defensive, for as John Caputo writes:

Confessing that we have no access to The Secret introduces a salutary caution into our lives which tends to contain the violence, the intellectual “road rage,” that threatens to break out whenever we run up against something “different.” (2001, 23)

For Caputo, secular modernity and “the death of God” helped religion to shed its tendency to define itself according to its access to The Secret; instead, religion could get back to its saltiness, its real character, which is a desire for the unknowable, a passion for the search, “a pact with the impossible” (49). So, religion in its “purest” form is by definition impure because its most intense desire is union with otherness: “perfect love drives out fear,” and faith drives out resistance to pluralism.

Under this definition, religion can seem to empower the disempowered. Hortense tells Irie, “I’ve waited fifty years to do something else in de Kingdom Hall except clean” (Smith 2001, 387), and

“I still hope to be one of the Anointed even if I am a woman. I want it all my life. I want to be dere wid de Lord making de laws and de decisions.” Hortense sucked her teeth long and loud. “I gat so tired wid de church always tellin’ me I’m a woman or I’m not heducated enough….But if I were one of de hundred an’ forty-four, no one gwan try to heducate me. Dat would be my job! I’d make my own laws an’ I wouldn’t be wanting anybody else’s opinions.” (409)

A black woman and an immigrant, Hortense can be read as a nexus of diverse identities of disempowerment, for even in her own home, she is instructed on her place as a Witness by the interloper Ryan Topps: “you must avoid interpretin’ scripture by yourself, Mrs. Bowden. In future, discuss it wiv myself and my colleagues” (389). Although Hortense responds submissively, she does add, “I feel like the Lord talk to me in a special way….it jus’ a bad habit” (389). Ryan might consult with learned pamphleteers, but Hortense says of the approaching Date of Judgment, “I felt it in my bones” (410). Hortense’s religion is heartfelt and sincere compared to Samad’s fear of old age and corruption (and particularly compared to Millat’s fundamentalist Mafia-Islam), but she does still utilize her faith for non-devotional purposes: hers is a religion for those who want what has always been possible for others—authority rather than servitude, knowledge rather than perpetual studenthood—to be no longer impossible for them.

Regardless of the justice of this desire, the utilization of religion as a political tactic blunts both politics and religion and reduces the potential of a radical faith because it is once again striving for ownership of The Secret while at the same time postponing the right to fulfilled desires until the afterlife. Hortense, in accordance with her religious practice, defers to the much younger and less intelligent Ryan Topps; her hopes for justice rest on the coming Day of the Lord and her future status as one of the blessed 144,000, a status that she must earn in the present time by submitting to oppression. The space that Caputo imagines in which religion actually alleviates existential angst and ontological “road rage” cannot open up while religious practice is clutched so tightly. The border between religious practice and religious faith may not be clearly demarcated, but there is still a denotative difference. About the multiplicity of post-secular religious manifestations, Caputo speculated “how deeply, if at all, some of this cuts into the lives of these people, whether any of it stays hatred, anger, and dishonesty or elicits generosity and love in daily life” (71). Religious practice is churchgoing, choir-singing, and obeying institutionally-prescribed behavior; religious faith “cuts into the lives” of believers, changing not only their institutionalized behavior but also their life practice on days other than Sunday—or Friday or Saturday. Obviously, faith and practice often coexist, but, also obviously, there is often one without the other. Religious practice, taken by itself, must resist pluralism because otherness increases ontological insecurity and corruption; religious faith, alone or accompanied by institutionalized practice, celebrates or at least tolerates otherness because of its overflowing generosity.

Although Hortense’s religious faith does “cut into” her daily life to a certain extent (evidenced by her compassion and hospitality to Ryan Topps and Irie), religion’s hold on her seems derived from other origins rather than a passion for the impossible that leads to generosity toward otherness. When Irie shows up on the doorstep, Hortense tells her:

“Black and white never come to no good. De Lord Jesus never meant us to mix it up. Dat’s why he made a hol’ heap a fuss about de children of men building de tower of Babel. ’Im want everybody to keep tings separate….When you mix it up, nuttin’ good can come.” (Smith 2001, 385)
Ironically, considering Hortense’s plans for the afterlife, God actually “fussed” about the tower of Babel in the Bible because of the hubris of men trying to become deities. God was the original mixer-upper; before Babel, everyone was the same.

In theory, Samad would agree with Hortense’s point, but in practice, he “mixes it up” himself. His middle-aged religious crisis is exacerbated by an affair with his sons’ white music teacher, Poppy Burt-Jones. When Millat, Magid, and Irie see Samad and Poppy sitting together on a park bench, Samad decides to break off the affair, split his twin sons apart, and send Magid back to Bangladesh where he can learn to be a good Muslim. People in Bangladesh are good Muslims; Magid is in Bangladesh; therefore, Magid is a good Muslim. And Magid’s letters seem to confirm the soundness of the syllogism, once Samad puts his slanted interpretation on them at least:

“When I grow up I think I should like to make sure vases are not put in such silly places where they can be dangerous and I would complain about other dangerous things too (by the way, my nose is fine now!). See!”

Clara frowned. “See what?”

“Clearly he disapproves of iconography in the mosques, he dislikes all heathen, unnecessary, dangerous decoration! A boy like that is destined for greatness, isn’t he?” (215)

Religion saves Samad from Poppy the English temptress, and it is supposed to save Magid from the heathen and make him into a great man.

But as Samad should have guessed, his decision to send Magid away doesn’t save anybody; instead, it undermines everything Samad hoped to accomplish. Magid and Millat are twins, a unit: Millat “did not hesitate before trying this, for the experience is not

the disruptive temporality of enunciation displaces the narratives of the Western nation which Benedict Anderson so perceptively describes as being written in homogeneous, serial time. (1994, 54)

Narration becomes enunciation, and emphasis falls on the momentary and transitory rather than the teleological. The goal is no static Utopia, but

the theoretical recognition of the split-space of enunciation may open the way to conceptualizing an international culture, based not on the exoticism of multiculturalism or the diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of culture’s hybridity. (56, emphasis in original)

Hybridity, then, is for Bhabha both a locus and an action, or a locus for action. Unfortunately, this can seem very vague: Bhabha would like to blur the distinction between theory and praxis, but if praxis becomes a theoretical space with no teleology, action can seem masturbatory and enunciation vacuous. This is the issue raised by Anthony Easthope, who writes of the interstitial Third Space that “I invite you to hesitate before trying this, for the experience is not
at all unfamiliar, for it is the experience of psychosis” (1998, 147). If Easthope’s criticism sounds familiar, it may be because Freud used a similar argument to condemn religion, for religious people are neurotics, comparable to members of indigenous tribes whose heads were deformed in childhood by being wrapped with bandages (1928, 81). These criticisms raise a series of questions that are painfully immediate in a world of globalization and fundamentalism: what do we enunciate in the Third Space, and how does hybridity evade homogeneity, seriality, and teleology? How can we inhabit inter-space without living nowhere, and must we either erase or conceal our differences or kill each other? Is it possible, as Bhabha claims, that “by exploring this Third Space, we may elude the politics of polarity and emerge as the others of our selves”? (1994, 56).

There can be no decisive Yes at this juncture, at least not without steamrolling certain complexities. White Teeth is evidence of the impossibility of the Yes, for its international culture of North London is populated by divided families, the members of which are either/or, both/and victims and perpetrators of violence, discrimination, anger, ontological insecurity, and religious and cultural intolerance. However, White Teeth is also a liminal communitas, an enunciation of the possibility of the impossible Yes.

In The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure, anthropologist Victor Turner writes of enunciation through performance. Turner describes the ritual liminality of rites de passage, focusing on the Ndembu of northwestern Zambia. He divides the ritual process into three segments: separation, margin (or liminality/communitas), and aggregation (1969, 94). The liminal phase is a pedagogical space in which the participant is separated from the community in order to learn about his role within that community before rejoining it. In this phase, all social distinction is leveled, and even a chief’s son is no different from anyone else. The phase is characterized by ritualized abuse in which the tribe bumps their buttocks against the chief-elect, and the Kafwana, leader of the ritual, instructs him:

“Let your wife prepare food for the people who come here to the capital village. Do not be selfish, do not keep the chieftainship to yourself! You must laugh with the people, you must abstain from witchcraft, if perchance you have been given it already! You must not be killing people! You must not be ungenerous to people!” (101)

After the ritual, social stratification returns, and there is once again a distinction between high and low in the village. The purpose of this liminal phase is pedagogical, for the initiate must learn “whiteness,” which is right relation between people, merely as human beings, and its fruits are health, strength, and all good things. “White” laughter, for example, which is visibly manifested by the flashing of teeth, represents fellowship and good company. (104, emphasis added)

The multicultural world of White Teeth is a pedagogical communitas in which characters can learn “whiteness,” not in the sense of a default race or uniform sameness, but rather the Ndembu quality of human goodness that cuts across stratification and difference. This is not to say, of course, that every character in the novel may be taught by his or her experience of liminality. It is probably safe to say that Marcus and Joyce Chalfen and “Dr. Sick” are impossible to educate, and the novel tellingly abandons Millat and Magid, like Candide, in a garden. But the final scene of the novel, which is Shakespearean in its stagecraft, suggests that Samad, at least, can begin to see the toothiness even in a black Christian. Outside the FutureMouse “launch,” Hortense and her choir of Witness women sing hymns in order to “witness” and to disrupt the wicked proceedings. When Clara enlists Samad to shut them up, he goes outside, but can’t find the heart to interrupt Hortense:

Samad watches it all and finds himself, to his surprise, unwilling to silence her. Partly because he is tired. Partly because he is old. But mostly because he would do the same, though in a different name. He knows what it is to seek. He knows the dryness. He has felt the thirst you get in a strange land—horrible, persistent—the thirst that lasts your whole life.

Can’t say fairer than that, he thinks, Can’t say fairer than that. (Smith 2001, 530)

Finally, Samad has the long-awaited epiphany. It is not corruption to hear hymns sung to a different name, but rather it is a proof of both the desire and the hope that he and Hortense share. Fundamentalist pedantry about who’s going to heaven and who isn’t suddenly seems less important than the fact that he understands at last, after twenty years in a foreign land, that sometimes, in some ways, strangers aren’t really strange.

Back inside, Millat pulls a gun on Dr. Sick, and Archie, who may well be the moral barometer of the novel, leaps in front of the bullet, sacrificing his body for someone he was supposed to kill almost fifty years before. When Archie steps between fundamentalism and hubristic, atheistic humanism, the caged FutureMouse (a symbol for human control, attainment of the unattainable, and eugenics) escapes back into the world of the accidental and the impossible. It is difficult to care much whether a Nazi gets shot or not, but Archie’s action not only rescues the FutureMouse but also redeems Millat, who, if he had been successful,
would have wound up in a prison instead of a garden. Although Smith herself believes that she failed to tie up all the novel’s different themes (O’Grady 2002, 107), this scene contradicts her, for in the last pages of the book, fundamentalism, humanism, accident, human kindness, and cultural diversity appear on stage together. The result is that both humanism and fundamentalism—twin paradigms of the known—falter in favor of the unknown, and xenophobia collapses in on itself after the realization that what salty people have in common, regardless of their color, culture, or creed, is an intense desire for the impossible.

Ironically, a solution for how the “desire for the impossible” can evade ontological insecurity (and the resulting fundamentalism and xenophobia) can be found in The Future of an Illusion. In defense of his argument in that book, Freud writes that “there is no danger of a devout believer, overwhelmed by my arguments, being deprived of his faith” (1928, 62). If a person’s affective connection to religion is based on religious faith rather than on mere religious practice, or on a cultural or familial affiliation, then that deep belief cannot be threatened by the arguments of non-believers or by cultural difference. When religion truly is a passion for God, a desire for the impossible, then the devotee is less concerned with saving face than with loving God and expressing generosity toward others. This is not a Rainbow Brite-esque “You can do anything if only you believe!” but rather a theology with loving God and expressing generosity toward all humanity.

As with the dominant figure of Samad, any person’s identity and thus entails an increasing immunity to threat. When a person is confident enough in her own faith that she fears neither the invalidity nor the dissolution of that faith, then she does not need to protect it, and she does not require it to protect her. Samad fears Western “corruption”; Hortense fears that she may not make it into the ranks of the Anointed and will therefore never escape servitude; Millat fears both the wrath of Allah and the prospect of “losing” to the West: each of those fears has to do with a kind of punishment, some version of possible loss or defeat. But a passion for the “unmasterable future,” like the agape love that St. John writes of, is a commitment to understanding instead of warfare, to generosity instead of “winning.”

Teeth, the recurring symbol of Smith’s book, can be interpreted as emblems of this commitment to generosity. They can represent both the color that we all have in common and the vulnerability that exposes the generous to abuse as in the case of Mr. J. P. Hamilton, but a reader should hesitate before identifying white teeth as symbols of any kind of universal humanness or as indicators that we’re really all the same on the inside. Even if people do have some kind of universal human core, in a post-secular, post-globalized, post-postmodern age, it is an act of imperialism to assume, from any position, that someone else’s insides are the same as yours. Charlie Durham makes this mistake, thinking that all Ambrosia needed was a little training, and he winds up remembered as a “no-good djam fool bwoy.” But white teeth can represent a recommended universal human practice or valuation as they do for Caputo and the Ndembu. “Whiteness,” for the Ndembu, is not a descriptor but a practice of generosity and kindness that must be observed by members of every social stratum. For Caputo, teeth are what we hang on by, both the evidence and the practice of faith and hope. In White Teeth, many of the characters are disempowered, discriminated against, and frightened by the always-immediate possibility of erasure: they are just barely hanging on. However, the novel does make room for hope, both explicitly and symbolically. Samad has an epiphany, and Irie plans to become a dentist after giving birth to her impossibly hybrid offspring, the child that it is only on the other side of religion, of which Irie is a practitioner in spite of being an atheist—the side that rejects fundamentalism and xenophobia in favor of faith and loving-kindness—that impossible hybridity can become an everyday practice.

WORKS CITED


Participation in the global economy does not come without social cost. After a half century of dormancy, the city of Shanghai is attracting international attention for its rapid modernization, asserting itself in the global scene with a spectacular new skyline, stunning architecture, and burgeoning international trade. It is one symbol of China’s recent ascendance. But this change has exacted considerable social cost to many of Shanghai’s residents because of the widespread demolition of their unique neighborhoods, the lilongs. High-rise buildings and wide boulevards have largely replaced these time-honored neighborhoods that once were the hub of urban life. Hundreds of thousands of long-time inner-city residents have been enticed, pressured, and sometimes forced to relocate to the outskirts of the city.

In this essay, we note similarities between Shanghai today and the Bangkok of the mid-90s before its dramatic economic collapse. We discuss why Bangkok declined and whether Shanghai is in danger of a similar fate. We point out the risk cities take in rapid modernization when their economies are vulnerable to the capriciousness of the global supply chain.

Steeples and pagodas were the insignia of modernization in medieval times as high-rise apartments and office buildings are today. The rise of skyscrapers is a global phenomenon that has unintended consequences. On the one hand, they add color and dimension to many flat cityscapes; on the other, they homogenize the look and feel of many cities worldwide. From New York to Hong Kong, cities have lost their individual personality; yet, homogenization of the built environment is only one of the problems of this global trend. In some cities, skyscrapers are also causing major social and environmental concerns.

The world’s most renowned architects are flocking to Shanghai, where they are building the world’s biggest skyscrapers and hotels, futuristic model towns, theme cities and numerous never-seen-before projects. All the innovation puts this Chinese city in the vanguard for style, ambition and experimentation. Once again.

(De Jong 2003)

Parts of Shanghai are now sinking at a rate of one-and-a-half centimeters a year, largely as a result of a massive building boom there over the last 10 years.

Now, as the city gradually sinks below the level of the Huang Pu River, the city fathers are getting cold feet—or should that be wet feet?

(De Jong 2003)
These commentaries reflect the irony in the rebirth of Shanghai as a modern metropolis. It could happen to any city, anywhere. In this latest round of globalization, as Thomas Friedman (2005) aptly puts it, advances in telecommunications and the Internet have flattened the global playing field, paving the way for the Third World to leapfrog to the First World in record time. But often it incurs unanticipated ecological and social consequences.

The phenomenal growth of the Chinese economy has been the focus of intense international attention in both the academic press and popular media. A recent cover story in *U.S. News and World Report* predicts that China, with an annual growth rate of 9 percent, will supersede Japan to become the world’s second largest economy by 2020 (Newman 2005). *Newsweek* declared the new millennium as China’s Century (Zakaria 2005). Shanghai, the financial center and largest city (pop. sixteen million), is the symbol of that ascendance.

A century ago, Shanghai was hailed as the Paris of the East and the most modern city in Asia. It, however, slipped into dormancy after the Communists gained control in 1949. In the early 1990s, with policy changes in Beijing, Shanghai began to rise again. At the 14th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in October 1992, Shanghai was designated as a special economic zone with preferential tax, trade, and financing privileges (Yatsko 2003, 22–23). Pudong, a large stretch of underdeveloped farmland and old warehouses across the river from the historic commercial center, was the focus. As Pudong took off, the rest of Shanghai followed, embarking on what has to be the greatest expansion of urban construction and global business in recent history.

Since 1990, more than 10,000 foreign companies have set up shop in Pudong and other parts of Shanghai. Multinational companies from Mary Kay Cosmetics to General Motors have chosen Shanghai for their Chinese headquarters. The marques of high-tech industry, such as Siemens, Intel, IBM, Philips, and Sony, also have built their manufacturing plants there. A new international airport has been opened in Pudong, featuring the world’s first Maglev train, which brings passengers to central Pudong in a fraction of the time of conventional transport. Modern highways and subways have also been built to ease the traffic.

In the 1990s, outside interests, including those from Hong Kong and Taiwan, invested 34 billion USD in Shanghai (Yatsko 2003, 213–214). High-rise apartments, offices, and hotels, including the Grand Hyatt on the top floors of the eighty-eight-story Jin Mao Building, now dominate the skyline on the east side of the Huangpu River. All in all, more than five thousand buildings of more than fourteen stories, including three hundred skyscrapers and countless modern commercial centers, have sprung up in Shanghai since 1985 (Hawthorne 2005).

Shanghai’s problem is not only too many skyscrapers on a drained swampland but also the vast relocation of people to the outskirts of the city, removed from the amenities of the redesigned metropo-
lis. Between 1992 and 2001, over 800,000 families have relocated to the suburbs from the central city. Suburban living in Shanghai has a different meaning and experience. In the early 1990s, speculation on the residential market outside the urban center caused a housing glut in the suburbs. Without a master plan, many of the new projects were hastily built and located in far away places. The state bought up some of these surplus properties and made them available for the evicted families (Laurans 2005). Thus, the families live in newer and bigger homes, but they also deal with construction defects and a lower quality of life. A retired doctor, transplanted from the city, describes the new apartment in which he and his wife live:

There’s a leaking pipe in the bedroom and the Housing Bureau says they can’t fix it because it’s a construction problem and therefore the responsibility of another bureau. The balcony floods because the drain is full of cement....No relatives ever visit us here because it’s too far. After dinner, there’s nothing to do. There’s no cinema or theatre.....We feel lonely. (qtd. in Yatsko 2003, 34–35)

The predicament of this couple highlights a problem that has until recently received little publicity. The massive urban renewal and displacement of city dwellers to the countryside is demolishing a way of life cherished by longtime inhabitants: the lilong. For more than a century, lilongs made up the majority of the main lanes, marking a clear boundary between the inside community and the outside city life. Through much of the last half of the 19th century, lilongs were the loci of social interactions. Living in the new suburban estates, even if free of construction defects, cannot afford the social benefits that make life exciting for former lilong residents.

Lilongs, the Hubs of Urban Life

Lilong, which literally means a neighborhood with lanes, had been the preferred way of housing for the Shanghai people dating back to the 1840s and once constituted 60 percent of the total residential area in the city (Guan 1996). While there are great variations in size and architectural style, a lilong is a dense block of homogeneous two or three-story townhouses with small courtyards and alleyways. The main alleys, dedicated to pedestrian traffic, run along the front of the townhouses, and narrower ones are located at the back and side. The main lanes, in turn, are connected to the larger city streets outside of the complex. It is not uncommon to have shops enclosing the entire lilong block. The number of homes inside a lilong may be as few as dozens and as many as hundreds. The number of lanes may also vary depending on the size of the settlement. Some lilongs have gates at the entrances of the main lanes, marking a clear boundary between the inside community and the outside city life.

Through much of the last half of the 19th century and early 20th century, lilongs were predominantly middle-class neighborhoods, but the passage of time took a heavy toll on these once well-groomed communities. While some of the lilongs today have been refurbished, others are timeworn and blighted. However, functioning as a social base, these compact, semi-enclosed communities harbor a strong sense of neighborhood (Guan 1996). Residents use the alleyways as outdoor living areas where children play and adults socialize. Domestic chores, like cooking and washing clothes, are sometimes done in the alleys. According to Darryl Chen, the alleyways make it possible for the residents to “form a strong social fabric which extends the nuclear family unit to a network of extended family and neighbors” (2003). Xiaowei Luo (professor of architecture at Shanghai’s Tongji University) has also written about the lilongs and their longtangs (the individual houses). Born in the city in 1925, Luo grew up with the lilongs before looking at them with the eyes of a scholar. To this long-time resident and professor, lilongs and Shanghai are inseparable; the history of one is the history of the other:

Longtang was a product of Shanghai and belongs to the Shanghai people. It tells the story of Shanghai and reflects the culture, lifestyle and philosophy of its people. There were many types of longtang houses, and every one was a part of the whole. Reading the longtangs is like reading the social history of Shanghai. (Luo 2001)

Even though the government has preserved and refurbished some of the lilongs for historical and cultural reasons, 64 percent have been knocked down (Lin 2005). Wu Jiang, a former activist for the preservation of Shanghai’s historic buildings, puts the estimate even higher, claiming that demolition has destroyed over 80 percent (“Background” 2004, 11). With the loss of the lilongs, a way of life and the living history of a great city disappears.

But the citizens of Shanghai have not given up their neighborhoods without a fight. In a paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Meeting (31 March–3 April 2005), Qin Shao (professor of modern East Asian history) reported that there was widespread resistance. People demonstrated in downtown Shanghai. They formed study groups and took their grievances to the courts. In a twist of political irony, their protests against the developers who were backed by local officials, reverted to the early tactics of the Communist Revolution. They planted the Red Flag, a symbol of the collective blood of the proletariat, on their bulldozed neighborhoods while they sang “The Internationale,” the communist anthem:

Arise ye workers from your slumbers
Arise ye prisoners of want
For reason in revolt now thunders
And at last ends the age of cant.
A bird’s eye view shows a lilong encroached upon by highrises.

The lane of a lilong serves as a conduit for social activities.
The decision to demolish or to refurbish may rest on nominal reason. City Bourgogne (Bugoli in Chinese) was saved because of its French name.
Sometimes, the fight between the residents and the developers has turned ugly. A sixty-five-year-old mother said her family members were physically assaulted when they refused to vacate their home (“Background” 2004). In another case, residents claimed that the eviction company hired bullies to harass them, vandalize their homes, smash doors and windows, and apply psychological pressures, such as playing loud music at night and broadcasting funeral chants by the windows of old folks (Laurans 2005).

It is generally believed that the redevelopment frenzy is fueled in part by the coming 2010 Shanghai World’s Fair; city hall wants to showcase Shanghai as a member of the “select club of globalized metropolises” (Laurans 2005). There is no doubt that Shanghai, with or without the World’s Fair, is determined to regain its past glories, and more. One official told the bureau chief of the Far Eastern Economic Review: “Shanghai won’t be a center just for China—that’s too small. It will be the leader in the world.” Very bold words. And at what cost? (Yatsko 2003, 11).

**Thailand’s Venture in Globalization**

The awe accorded Shanghai reminds us of Bangkok, Thailand’s political and business center of six and a half million. In fact, Shanghai’s development could fall into the same trap as Bangkok. From 1985 to 1996, Bangkok experienced growth similar to Shanghai today; Thailand was the world’s fastest growing economy during that period, averaging 9 percent growth in gross domestic product (GDP) and an increase in exports averaging 19.8 percent per year (Phongpaichit & Baker 1998).

This unprecedented expansion of Thailand’s economy was the result of huge foreign investment and a reorientation toward export-oriented manufacturing. Manufacturing exports increased from less than 50 percent of total exports in 1985 to over 80 percent in 1996. In less than a decade, Thailand transformed itself from a country known for agricultural products to a producer of high-tech components for the Information Age. There was also a corresponding growth in the low-profile industries, such as textiles, auto parts, and home appliances. Some economists predicted Thailand would become the world’s eighth-largest economy by 2020 (Phongpaichit & Baker 1998).

Like Shanghai a decade later, Bangkok went on a construction spree. The Robot Building, completed in 1986 as headquarters of the Bank of Asia, was the first of a series of unique architectural structures that changed the Bangkok skyline. In 1988, another landmark, the thirty-two-story Elephant Building, combined residential and commercial complexes. Other flamboyant high-rises, mimicking Gothic cathedrals and Roman temples, sprouted up everywhere in an architectural excess (Bello, Cunningham, & Poh 1998).

Again like Shanghai in the 21st century, Bangkok launched a massive overhaul of its transportation system in the 90s: building an elevated light rail, the Skytrain, that serves the urban core (service commenced in 1999); restarting work on a long planned second international airport (scheduled for completion in June 2006); and constructing an underground subway system (completed in 2004). Most of the funds for these projects came from the private sector.

But growth began to decline in 1996, and by 1997 the economy took a deep dive. Finance One, Thailand’s biggest finance company, collapsed, triggering the closure or suspension of two-thirds of all finance firms. Other financial woes amassed: foreign capital fled; the baht fell by over 100 percent relative to the dollar; and the stock market dropped by half its value. The number of unemployed surged, including many of the previously free-spending middle-class (Phongpaichit & Baker 1998; 2001).

A convergence of a number of factors caused the collapse of the Thai economy: Japan’s pull back of its investment in Thailand because of economic problems at home; improved investment opportunities in Europe and the U.S.; the strengthening of the European Union and NAFTA trade blocks that inhibit export opportunities; and the emergence of China and India as alternative low-cost manufacturing sites. However, the single most important factor was a massive oversupply in the property sector. Driven by unchecked optimism that an expanding economy would create demands for more office space and middle-class housing, Thailand went on a construction binge that was disastrous.

In 1997, nearly 400,000 housing units were unsold in Bangkok, and work on most construction projects stopped (Phongpaichit & Baker 1998, 15; Shameen 1997, 1). In 2003, there were still three hundred unfinished high-rise buildings in the city (Bangkok Highrisers 2003). Many were without walls and windows, leading the locals to call them “fly-thru” buildings. They stood as sad reminders of Bangkok’s misadventure in globalization. Making the scene all the more unsettling was the countless number of homeless people living on the streets and in abandoned buildings within sight of Bangkok’s excesses.

The economy of Thailand started to recover in the early 2000s. The government’s determined effort to present Thailand as a friendly country with an open-arms policy to all, from tourists to investors, seems to have worked in the interest of its economy. Simultaneously, it aggressively sought close economic partnerships with other nations. As of 2003, it had concluded free trade agreements with a dozen countries, including Australia, China, and India. All those efforts have helped to bring back foreign invest-
Bangkok’s extremes: Robot Building, Chang or “Elephant” Building, a fly-thru, and the homeless.
ments and increased exports. Unemployment rates dropped from the peak of 4.4 percent in 1998 to 2.0 in 2004, and increased consumption and investment spending along with strong export growth pushed the GDP to 6.9 percent in 2003 and 6.1 percent in 2004 (“Thailand’s” 2005). Although the rate is lower than in the high-growth years before the financial crisis and before the devastating December 2004 tsunami, the general consensus is that the Thai economy is healthy again. While a number of “fly-thru” buildings still stand abandoned in Bangkok, construction has restarted on most in the past two years and many are now completed.

Will Shanghai Face the Same Fate for Its Excesses?

There are many differences between Bangkok and Shanghai. Most notably, the size of its population at 1.3 billion people gives China the potential for an internal mass consumer market that far surpasses the potential of Thailand with a population of 65 million. As mentioned earlier, Thomas Friedman (2005), in his book The World Is Flat, argues that the global fiber-optic network has led to a unique economic opportunity for countries like China and India at the start of the 21st century. On the other hand, Jared Diamond in an equally provocative work, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (2005), predicts serious long-term environmental problems for China as a consequence of its dramatic economic growth and its desire to duplicate first-world lifestyles for its population, an observation echoing the irony of modernization put forth at the start of this discourse.

Both authors also make arguments that suggest the vulnerability of Shanghai to the problems once experienced by Bangkok. Friedman emphasizes the importance of maintaining a place in the global supply chain of this new world economy—be it as a collaborator in financing, manufacturing, research and development, technical support, packaging, distribution, or any of the necessary functions that encompass the life of a product from the point of inception to the point of consumption. Diamond explains the historic importance of friendly trade partners to the stability of societies and the damage of deteriorating trade relationships. The crisis of Thailand was partially caused by changes inherent in its place in the supply chain—notably once the world’s largest hard-disk supplier. Again, the development of the European Union and NAFTA, along with problems in Japan and the rise of China and India, significantly changed its position in the global supply chain. Also, fluctuations in demand due to swift advances in technology could quickly affect the fortunes of a global supplier. The Thais had little control over these factors that so powerfully affected them.

While China may face problems similar to those that derailed the Thai economy, it has an additional obstacle that Thailand never faced—threats of trade sanctions by its major trading partners. Thailand was never a threat, but China’s enormous economic base and military strength have alarmed the United States, the European countries, and its Asian neighbors. Furthermore, outsourcing to China has cost employment and manufacturing capacity in the Western nations. These issues have aroused protectionist sentiments in the West that call for trade sanctions against China, which would spark significant upheaval in its economy (Mayer 2005). For a society to continue to prosper, as Friedman contends in his thesis, it cannot afford to alienate its trading partners.

Equally ominous for Shanghai is the problem of over-commitment of Chinese banks in supporting the enormous construction. Concern was raised in 2004 when the vacancy rate in residential property was 25 percent compared to the international norm of 10 percent (“China’s” 2004). The collapse of over-extended banks that financed the Bangkok’s building boom was the trigger that set that city back for years. Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of People’s Bank of China, acknowledged the scale of China’s bad debt problem:

I believe that while large-scale commercial banks are working hard, according to certain classification, their bad debts already exceeded 40 percent, so we are at the edge of a financial crisis. (“China” 2004)

A recent article by Don Lee, who writes from Shanghai for the Los Angeles Times, describes the current housing market crisis. While one million units are under construction, sales have virtually halted in some areas of the city. He quotes Andy Xie, Morgan Stanley’s chief Asia economist in Hong Kong: “They’ll remain empty for years” (Lee 2006).

It is estimated that three thousand brokerage offices have closed since the spring of 2005, and banks are worried about a wave of default loans. Zhu Delin, finance professor at Shanghai University and former head of the Shanghai Banking Association, states: “I think it’ll take at least three years before the property market becomes healthy again” (qtd. in Lee 2006).

The question is how much the real estate crisis will affect the rest of Shanghai’s economy. Yin Zhongli, an economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, worries that the financial sector will be crippled by the real estate fallout given that 76 percent of all bank loans in Shanghai last year were in real estate (qtd. in Lee 2006).

In sum, Shanghai appears to be going through the same developmental cycle and crises as Bangkok in the 1990s: a rash of foreign investments ignites an instantaneous economic boom that in turn spurs heavy
speculation in real estate. Foreign investments, however, could shift swiftly, as was the case of Bangkok, leaving its banks with portfolios of empty or unfinished buildings and non-performing loans. This scenario could also happen in Shanghai. But the possibility of bursting its growth bubble may not be the greatest problem facing the city. After all, cities can recover from even severe economic collapse. Bangkok has largely recovered and is rebuilding on its ruins. The greater loss for Shanghai may be the destruction of its unique lilong neighborhoods and the lifestyle associated with them. History, sentiment, and social bond cannot be rebuilt with glass and steel. There may be no recovery from this loss.

WORKS CITED


GLOBALIZATION
AND HIGHER EDUCATION—
Challenge or Peril?

ROBERT H. CRAIG
THE COLLEGE OF ST. SCHOLASTICA

The term and concept of “globalization” brings a host of images to mind, many of which have been popularized in Thomas Friedman’s *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. Friedman believes that the unique aspects of globalization are the democratization of technology, finance, and information driven by a free-market capitalist system that opens one’s economy to trade and competition resulting in the achievement of a more efficient and prosperous economy (2000, 8, 46–72). Some of Friedman’s most enduring images of globalization, at least for my students, are his animal metaphors that illustrate the pace and nature of globalization. It is as if globalization were analogous to a race between a lion and a gazelle, with the lion knowing that it will go hungry if it cannot outrun the slowest gazelle, and the gazelle knowing that if it cannot outrun the lion, it will be its breakfast. Likewise those who have neither the skills nor ability to adapt to the changing order of things are simply “turtles” (331). Of course, all of these images are enmeshed in an overall analysis of the wonders of the brave new world of globalization and the glories that result from a neoliberal-capitalist reorganizing of the globe (44–72, 112–142, 348–364).

Even though Friedman makes passing reference to the importance of the rootedness of things and the value of tradition, as embodied in the olive tree, and grants that there are some possible downsides to globalization, it is clear that the olive trees of this world will be paved over to provide room for the Lexus to more quickly move from place to place, leaving us with the Lexus and the “virtual” olive tree (29–43, 468–475, 327–347). Finally, Friedman is best characterized as one of those “journalistic cheerleaders” who “equate globalization with the worldwide ascendancy of American commodities, institutions, and values” (Foner 2001, 4).

Globalization from Above
and Globalization from Below

Having given my due to a popularized understanding of globalization, I now turn to the more scholarly insights of Richard Falk, professor emeritus of international law and practice at Princeton University, who distinguishes between two forms of globalization: “Globalization from Above” and “Globalization from Below” (1995, 172–206). Globalization from above refers to a process that is largely economic and stresses global transfers of capital, labor, and knowledge—all aided by technological innovations that have occurred since the 1960s (Mittelman 1996, 229). Focus thereby has largely been on the dynamics of globalization as they relate to the internationalization of business and financial resources (Falk 1995, 174).

Falk stresses that globalization from above has two predominate features: the first is a marked loss of control that nation-states have over their own economic policy, which varies from state to state; the second is the economic decisions that are made within the context of a global polity that stresses the maximization of growth and profits as primary (174). The resulting political fallout is a direct challenge to traditional understandings of national sovereignty (174). Arjun Appadurai observes that from the perspective of nation-states, it is a global process that “erodes…the working of national sovereignty in the domains of economics, law

Robert H. Craig, Ph.D., is professor of history and international studies at The College of St. Scholastica (Duluth, Minnesota) and chair of the Department of History, Politics, and Culture. He is currently working on a book-length study of religion and civil liberties during times of war. He has been a Fulbright scholar to Norway and is the author of *Religion and Radical Politics* (Temple University Press, 1995).
and political allegiance” (1999, 232). The underside of this process is a widening gap between rich and poor nations and a decreasing sense of public responsibility for the social and environmental impact of a market economy upon the individual and collective lives of people (Falk 1995, 176).

For Falk and others, globalization from above not only acerbates human and environmental destruction with its accompanying racial, class, and geographical tensions but also leads to a future that on a global scale accentuates power relationships that do not allow us to adequately address the economic well-being of the world’s peoples (“Dueling” 1999, 110–112).

Jean-Bertrand Aristide in his noted work, *Eyes of the Heart: Seeking a Path for the Poor in an Age of Globalization*, describes vividly the impact of the globalization on the poor; he asks us to think about our new century in terms of the “1.3 billion people living on less than one dollar a day” while an additional “three billion, or half of the population of the world lives on less than two dollars a day” (2000, 5). For those who believe that the benefits of globalization trickle down to the poor, Aristide reminds us that while the rich have grown richer, the poor have become poorer. Since 1960, the richest 20 percent of the world’s population has increased its share of the world’s wealth from 70 percent to 86 percent; at the same time, the poorest 20 percent have endured a decrease in their share of the wealth from 2.3 to merely 1 percent (5).

Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman views globalization as “time/space compression” along a continuum of hierarchical relations, expressed in concentrations of economic power and massive inequalities that extend globally across the face of the earth (1998, 121).

Globalization from below, in contrast, is a critical stance and dialogue about the forces that shape globalization from above (Falk 1995, 119). Globalization from below represents those who seek to forge a new global consciousness, around not the logic of the market but rather the role of law and global institutions in the furtherance of the goals of “nonviolence, social justice, and ecological balance” (87). Organizationally, examples range from those who organize around the need for an international response to debt relief for poor nations to local grass-roots initiatives that stress the need for values that are human-centered and ecologically sound (199). It includes those who seek to speak about geopolitics in ways that can lead to the emergence of a global civil society.

The term Falk uses to describe this process is humane governance, [based on] the effective realization of human rights, including economic and social, and the extension of participatory mechanisms and accountability procedures to the arenas in which geopolitical and global market forces are operative. (122)

Visible manifestations of globalization from below are transnational networks and organizations created by women and indigenous peoples who seek the expansion of human rights, the promotion of democracy, and a concern for the environment (199). Coupled with these networking efforts are initiatives on both regional and local levels that strive to foster a political climate in which concern for the social and economic well-being of everyone is central to the economic and political process (200).

A hopeful sign of an emerging global civil society is the “development of a moral, legal and somewhat spiritual sense of solidarity among all powers on issues of human rights” as a foundation for creating a life of human decency for the world’s peoples (Falk 1997, 180). Equally important is the struggle of non-governmental organizations, civil initiatives, and international social forces that take seriously the international standards of justice embodied in the United Nation’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights. (181)

A clear indicator of a growing resistance to globalization from above is the demonstration in Seattle, Washington, in response to the meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO). While supporters of globalization, such as Thomas Friedman, viewed the demonstrators and the critique they offered the WTO as analogous to “flat-earth advocates,” others saw the meeting of the WTO as indicative of a “democratic deficit” in a decision-making process that affects global communities (Tabb 2000, 1, 3). In other words, the WTO represented not only the interests of corporations and governing elites in the shaping of public policy but also the enactment of global policies that diminished the lives of people and reinforced modes of behavior that celebrated “corporate greed…and the single minded pursuit of accumulation, which threatens the planet and all living things” (1).

Globalization and Education

The relevance of distinguishing between two models of globalization is important to the perceived role of higher education in the future. If globalization is seen primarily in terms of shifting trends in the marketplace, then perhaps the most appropriate change required in higher education is an adaptation of skills and curriculum to prepare students to compete in a global economy (Davies 1997, 435). Thus, there would be the call for a well-trained workforce with a “competitive advantage” that can meet the demands of the present. Beyond this, forms of globalization from above are already radically restructuring the nature of the academy. An analysis of this trend is most evident in a recent work, *Universities and Globalization*, which grew out of the World Congress on Comparative Education (Sydney, Australia, 1996).
and was edited by Jan Currie and Janice Newson. The editors find particularly disquieting the extent to which globalization has imposed corporate managerial practices, questionable forms of accountability, and privatization that are shaping the character and function of institutions in Australia, New Zealand, United States, Canada, and Norway (1998, 141–191).

We are all aware of the degree to which the university has been subject to the business model of both leadership and organizational structure, but even more telling for Currie and Newson is that the defining terms of our institutional life are increasingly viewed as “business rather than…education” (142). Thus they argue, we should not be surprised that presidents and vice-chancellors no longer think of themselves as “first among equals” or as operating through consensual leadership but as chief executive officers of corporate enterprises with multi-million-dollar budgets. (142)

Adopting the values of the corporate world, with all of its accompanying hierarchical assumptions about power and privilege, results in the restructuring of universities into larger divisions with the appointment of executive deans, the widening gaps between management and academics, the increased salaries of managers and the lack of trust that has developed and continues to develop between managers and academics. (144)

As for the issue of accountability, it comes as no revelation that the discourse of accountability is more and more rooted in language of “economic rationalism, neo-liberalism and vocationalism” (145). Hence quality control and performance-based assessment measures, with their standardizing techniques, are based on the assumption that education is simply another form of business, distinguished only by its knowledge workers (145). As for privatization, “education is…conceived as a private commodity for the individual degree holder rather than a public good that serves the interests of citizens of the society as a whole” (148). Privatization also means the university is in the business of the production of commodifiable knowledge that can be packaged and sold in the marketplace (148–149).

If, on the other hand, the major challenges posed by globalization are seen as developing humane governance and aiding the emergence of new patterns of human relationships that foster a global civil society, then the role of the university is perceived quite differently. While I believe the process of globalization from below is more in keeping with the values, purposes, and goals of higher education, I do not dispute the need to equip students of whatever age for the 21st century in terms of their development of certain skills, both technological and informational. Even if one concludes that adaptive skills should be the part of an educational response to globalization, one still needs to ask how those skills are utilized and on whose behalf they are to be used. At the same time, however, it is important to remember that education is far more than skill development. Hence, one can recognize the value of globalization and still view it as a process in which students become creative citizens who are critical consumers of commodities, media reports, and economic policies, who ask questions beyond those of individual or national self-interest when they assess the equity of economic and political choice. (Cornwell & Stoddard 1999, 13)

Some of the implications of the second model of globalization for higher education are apparent in the observations of the UNESCO World Conference on Higher Education in the 21st Century. Clearly evident from this conference, and preceding conferences, is the high degree of congruence between aims of those dedicated to education and those involved in furthering globalization from below. Educators pointed out that the key role for education for the 21st century is promoting active citizenship as a condition for full participation in society (“Hamburg” 1998, 54).

Moreover, education linked to globalization from below implies a fundamental rethinking about questions of age, gender equality, disability, language, and cultural and economic disparities. It assumes that learning not only takes place over the course of a lifetime but also that traditional ways of compartmentalizing knowledge and approaching the educative process are in need of re-examination. The 21st century raises the question of exclusion of those who have too often been marginalized by their respective societies and the extent to which teaching adult learners means confronting the interrelationship of economic, social, political, and ecological issues (“Mumbai” 1998, 7–13). Central to the process that we label education is the belief stated in the “Declaration of the Fourth UNESCO Conference on Adult Education” (1985):

the act of learning, lying as it does at the heart of all educational activity, changes human beings from objects at the mercy of events to subjects who create their own history. (qtd. in “Mumbai” 1998, 5)

Education means people taking control of their own lives and educators willing to acknowledge that they can learn from others—especially from people historically considered unimportant because of their lack of power, status, and prominence, dismissed by people who measure the world by the standards of wealth and privilege. Hence, human values are more important than market values, and fostering an environment in which democracy is possible puts the needs of people at the center of one’s endeavors (Aristide 2000, 35).

An invaluable insight comes from those working in the field of adult education. Budd Hall, a participant in a preparatory conference in India, notes that the most
challenging work in adult education has been done outside the academy in community-based involvement or active participation in movements for social change (1998, 28). It is, therefore, not surprising that concern for adult education arises “most often from the subjugated corners of our societies” that question the constitutive nature of knowledge and the nature of how institutions of higher education structure and conceive their mission (28). In response to the changing experience of those living in what we have traditionally deemed the “real world,” educational institutions must change how they are organized in terms of flexibility, teaching methods, the role of prior learning experience, and distance education (28).

My attention now focuses on the United States and how globalization from below poses three interrelated challenges to education that, in varying degrees, extend beyond its borders. The first is moral and social accountability, the second is multiculturalism, and the third is global education—how to live and work in a changing global environment.

Moral and Social Accountability. One problem facing American society is the increasing inability to speak about common life and wants, a language that appears to be conspicuously absent from the public arena. “Poverty of public imagination” distinctly describes the present dilemma—a lack of public discourse about central problems that confront us as a nation and world community. In part, American political culture, especially its vocabulary and modes of political and social debate, has produced an individualistic mode of discourse (McCollough 1991, 73–75). The end result, according to Daniel Rodgers, is the difficulty for Americans “to talk about the common bonds and responsibilities in public life” (1987, 223). Moreover, the tragedy of our times is that in both word and deed we seem to believe that the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, the haunting faces of the homeless, and the tens of thousands of permanently unemployed men and women are societal givens in a changing world economy. In short, we have lost sight of the moral and social obligations we owe to one another.

Noted American scholar Edward LeRoy Long Jr. has authored a recent work with the arresting title, Higher Education as a Moral Enterprise, in which he concludes:

Higher education dare not become merely the avenue to success; it must be the gateway for responsibility. It should not be concerned with competence alone, but with commitment to civic responsibility. An academic degree should not be a hunting license only for self-advancement, but an indication of abilities to seek, cultivate, and sustain a richer common weal. It is not enough to achieve cultural literacy; we must engender social concern. It is not enough merely to open the mind; it is necessary to cultivate moral intentionality in a total selfhood. (1992, 221)

Equally important is helping students to be better informed citizens who take the responsibility of citizenship seriously, especially as members of a global society, because a democratic society is dependent upon the active participation of all of its people. David Hiley, writing in Liberal Education, makes the case that a crucial outcome for education is the cultivation of a “democratic disposition”:

No matter how successful we are at designing a curriculum, developing course descriptions, implementing changes, reallocating resources, reforming pedagogy, and assessing outcomes, if we cannot prepare students who can participate meaningfully in democratic deliberations about important issues, and if we cannot do so in ways that preserve the democratic institutions that make our activity possible, we will have failed. (1996, 25)

Social scientists and educators, Laurent Daloz et al., completed an intriguing study, Common Fire: Leading Lives of Commitment in a Complex World, that examines the gender, ethnicity, race, and social class of one hundred individuals from a range of backgrounds who are representative of men and women at various stages in their professional lives (1996, 6–7, 243–247). A key question of this study is what sustains people’s commitment to social change on behalf of the common good over time (5). A key discovery is the “habits of mind,” a concept borrowed from William Perry (Daloz 1996, 11). Habits of mind is what enables people to deal with dramatic changes in their own lives and the world around them while, at the same time, fostering a humane, intelligent, and constructive response to the complex challenges of life (Daloz et al. 1996, 107–108). The habits of mind are the following:

1. The habit of dialogue, grounded in the understanding that meaning is constructed through an ongoing interaction between oneself and others;
2. The habit of interpersonal perspective taking, the ability to see through the eyes and respond to the feelings and concerns of others;
3. The habit of critical, system thought, the capacity to identify parts and the connections among them as coherent patterns, and to reflect evaluatively on them;
4. The habit of dialectical thought, the ability to recognize and work effectively with contradictions by resisting closure or by reframing one’s response;
5. The habit of holistic thought, the ability to intuit life as an interconnected whole in a way that leads to practical wisdom. (108)
One conclusion Daloz et al. draw from their study is that these habits of mind are essential to overcoming cynicism and holding on to one’s commitments in a world that is constantly changing (124).

**Multiculturalism.** The second challenge is multiculturalism, a central part of American life from the start but only now beginning to be taken seriously, perhaps because of changing demographic realities. However, multiculturalism is not merely a question of demographics but a way of incorporating the history of this country (ourselves) within a paradigm shift that overcomes our preoccupation with the experience of transplanted European immigrants.

By telling the story of this country differently, we not only listen to different voices, explore different options... but hold up to ourselves a mirror in which we see ourselves differently. (Craig 1992, 231)

That is why I am constantly reflecting on the disquieting words of Adrienne Rich:

When those who have the power to name and socially construct reality choose not to hear you, whether you are dark-skinned, old, disabled, female or speak with a different accent or dialect than theirs, when someone who with the authority of a teacher, say, describes the world and you are not in it, there is a moment of psychic disequilibrium, as if you looked into a mirror and saw nothing. (qtd. in American Commitments National Panel Staff, 1995)

Multiculturalism is also an acknowledgment that in wrestling realities of race, class, gender, and all the varying dimensions of human diversity, students might be better prepared to shape a world that preserves rather than endangers life, which builds community and fosters a respect for both human difference and equality. Perhaps, in the end, students as well as teachers might come to value other people’s experiences, explore the ways in which their own lives are enriched by the challenges posed by human diversity, and realize how difference is a source of greater understanding.

Will Kymlicka, a Canadian political theorist, states the challenge of multiculturalism most clearly in his work *Multicultural Citizenship* (1995). The United States is not alone (as we can see by the recent events in the former Yugoslavia) in the ways in which problems of difference and adjustment to it are part of a worldwide political agenda. Traditionally, minority groups or cultures in a given democratic nation-state have had to define what it means to be a citizen in terms decided by the hegemonic majority. Of late, the rules of the game are being rewritten (Taylor 1996, 408). Kymlicka confronts us with the need to think about multiculturalism in new ways, ways that protect minority cultural groups from the unfair competition of the majority or dominant groups and at the same time recognize that all groups, whether they are dominant or not, need not to penalize nor to restrict individuals within their own cultural group (1995, 45, 113–117). Kymlicka’s analysis is more than time permits here, but he does force us to see that multiculturalism poses some difficult political and social choices that we need to make, and make wisely, so that people can learn not only to live together but benefit from each other’s wisdom, insights, and respective historical experience. In the end, it is an acknowledgment of both equality and interdependence—that the lives of people, individually and collectively, are inextricably interrelated and that what happens to one invariably happens to the other.

**Global Education.** The third and final challenge is living in an interdependent world with interlocking economics, political systems, and cultural perceptions. To believe that we can exist in an isolated vacuum from the world around us is to encourage a form of indifference and naïveté that is ill-suited for comprehending and addressing the complexities of the modern era.

I begin with the premise, held by a number of global educators, of the need to immerse our thinking about and reflecting on problems and issues that cross national boundaries, and about the interconnectedness of systems—ecological, cultural, economic, political and technological. Global education involves perspective thinking—seeing through the eyes and minds of others—and it means the realization that while individuals and groups may view life differently, they also have common needs and wants. (McCabe 1997, 42)

Global education also entails an intellectual curiosity about the world that transcends students’ local and national boundaries (42).

Seeing through the eyes of others implies and assumes an openness to new experiences, other points of view, and risks that can well threaten traditional ways by which students understand the world and themselves. Hence, global education can enhance students’ personal growth by examining their own assumptions, values, and moral choices. Students are challenged through the study of other regions of the world because an alternative context raises essential questions about rights, responsibilities, and the quality of life that are central to our educational purpose as institutions of higher learning.

In closing, I return briefly to *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* because there is a sense in which globalization, particularly globalization from above as portrayed by Friedman, is viewed both as inevitable and irreversible (2000, 407). Eric Foner, professor of history at Columbia University, reminds us “the question is not whether globalization will continue, but globalization
Globalization is also a two-way phenomenon that assumes that local and national responses are possible and that passivity in the face of a market-driven model of globalization is not the only response. Here the university can play a vital role in assisting local communities’ resistance to the forces of globalization that seek to McDonaldize or homogenize local cultural traditions and values as well as aiding communities to maintain locally based social, economic, and political dimensions of life that make the community both viable and possible (Currie & Newson 1998, 308). Ideally, this can be done by involving local people, local policy makers, and local experts [who can] make it possible to identify how the processes of globalization affect local communities and, therefore, the kinds of actions to be taken to ameliorate those effects if they cannot be avoided. (Ilon & McGinn 1997, 359)

But this presumes that we struggle to keep alive the idea of the university as “a center of intellectual life that sustains a lively, self-reflective relation to the large world” (353). In other words, we must continue to provide a space for generating insight, for refining critical judgment, and for encouraging disciplined inspirational visionary thinking that can substantially enliven and give direction to social, political, and economic institutions. (Currie & Newson 1998, 309)

Furthermore, keeping alive the vital function of the university in an age of globalization demands links with the world outside the academy. This means more than seeing the value of the university in serving those “signs” of leadership so that globalization of higher education that was more sorely in need of leadership, it is now. Sadly, too many educational leaders see themselves as CEOs or corporate shills rather than as visionaries or voices speaking for alternative ways of addressing globalization. The Rev. Theodore Hesburgh, former president of the University of Notre Dame, laments the extent to which university leaders are less and less engaged in debates over public policy or significant moral and social issues. What is needed, he maintains, are signs that more presidents of our colleges [are] willing to take the lead in tackling at least a few of those issues, reminding the public—and perhaps even each other—that they are custodians of institutions where independent, ethical, and compassionate thinking must flourish. (2001, B20)

Hopefully, we can aid and encourage the emergence of those “signs” of leadership so that globalization from below can flourish.

NOTES


2 For an informed discussion of globalization and inequality, see Michael Blim, Equality and Economy: The Global Challenge (Walnut Creek CA: AltaMira Press, 2005).

WORKS CITED


ALL ABOUT THE BEAN

THE GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE OF COFFEA

DAVID C. JOHNSON
FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

Oh Coffee, you dispel the worries of the Great, you point the way to those who have wandered from the path of knowledge....All cares vanish as the coffee cup is raised to the lips. Coffee flows through your body as freely as your life’s blood, refreshing all that it touches. —Sheik Ansari Djezeri Hanball Abd-al-Kadir

Approximately 110 million people in the United States drink coffee every day. If the Empire State Building were a giant coffee cup, Americans would need twenty-five refills a year to quench their thirst. Globally, people consume around 400 billion cups of coffee a year (“Coffee” 2002). The caffeine from coffee keeps people from falling asleep while driving, releases endorphins to elevate mood when awaking, and provides an ideal beverage to drink while discussing the nuances of string theory. Yet coffee is much more than a beverage that keeps people alert.

The globalization of coffee started in the beginning of the first millennium, and today coffee is the second most valuable commodity exported from the tropics, trailing only petroleum. Coffee employs millions of people who plant, cultivate, transport, and roast the seed (bean) of a cherry belonging to an evergreen tree. When the roasted beans are ground and seeped in hot water, a beverage results that Turkish merchants in the fifteenth century consumed in large quantities. One hundred years ago, the caffeine within coffee provided energy for the laborers who fueled U.S. industrialization. The embrace of coffee became complete when in the 1950s the Brazilians coined the term “coffee break” as part of an advertising campaign to increase consumption. Today, this phrase is part of the standard lexicon and a coffee break is a tradition among many professions and social classes worldwide.

In the first millennium, various species of Coffea grew in the tropical belt extending from western Africa to India. Although more than one hundred species of Coffea grew wild in this region, three species would produce 99 percent of the world’s supply (Hatton 1990, 13–14). The etymology of the English word “coffee” is debatable yet nonetheless provides a clue about its early globalization. Ethiopians were the first people to consume coffee, and the word itself derived from either the Arab word for wine, qahwa (h), the Turkish word for the beverage, kaveh, or the Kaffa region of Ethiopia. Coffee assumed its Romance language version, caffé, from the dominant merchants of the Mediterranean—the Italians (Ukers 1935, 11; Pendergrast 1999, 7; Hatton 1990, 15–21). The globalization of coffee started during the classical era of Arabian medicine (A.D. 850–900) as the bean began its rapid spread from its birthplace in Ethiopia to Yemen, Egypt, Arabia, and Sudan. Little is known about the origin of the beverage. However, conjecture leads to the belief that the first coffee drink originated by brewing the berries and the leaves. People in the Red Sea region still drink “Sultani” coffee, using dried berries in the summer. The focus eventually shifted to brewing the roasted bean and the resulting beverage assumed a form recognizable today (Sauer 1994, 132). Commenting on the initial consumption of coffee, one Arab chronicler, ’Abd al-Qādir al-Jarārā, wrote that “news reached us in Egypt that a drink called qahwa had spread in Yemen and was being used by Sufi
shaykhs and others to help them stay awake during their devotional exercises” (Hattox 1990, 14).

A popular fable about a young goat herder and a monastery in Upper Egypt demonstrates that Christians also used coffee to keep from falling asleep during religious services. According to legend, one morning goatherd Kaldi noticed that his flock possessed extra-ordinary energy after eating the berries of a particular tree. An abbot heard about the frisky goats and directed Kaldi to bring him the magical berries. The abbot subsequently boiled some of the berries and drank the resulting beverage. Thereafter, the monks of his abbey had no difficulty staying awake for mass:

The monks each in turn,  
as the evening draws near,  
Drink 'round the great cauldron—  
a circle of cheer!  
And the dawn in amaze,  
revisiting that shore,  
On the idle beds of ease  
surprised them nevermore!  
(qtd. in Ukers 1935, 10)

The drink spread from the ecclesiastical community and became embedded within the consumer culture of the Red Sea region. Coffee was in the process of being globalized amongst other Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, and Asian peoples. In 1616, the Dutch loaded the first European cargo of coffee onboard the merchant vessel Nassau. Coffeehouses, viewed as places of political intrigue and subversion by the Royal Houses of Europe, sprouted from Vienna to Berlin.

Yet in addition to providing facilities to discuss Enlightenment ideology, European coffeehouses also served as informal business headquarters. In 1688, Edward Lloyd opened a coffeehouse in London that catered to ship owners seeking information about market conditions. The venerable Lloyds of London was born when vessel masters, merchants, consignees, and ship owners met and agreed upon marine insurance contracts while drinking a commodity that their ships transported to European colonists in British North America. The Dutch, instrumental in improving the productivity of many tropical commodities, started to grow coffee in their Indonesian colonies. The Moslems, the original promulgators of coffee, disseminated seedlings to India. By 1712, Amsterdam created the first coffee exchange and auctioned coffee grown in Yemen. As only one component in a rapidly increasing trade in commodities, coffee began its globalization slightly after cocoa, which at the time was drunk as a beverage, and about the same time as tea (Sauer 1994, 132–137; Ukers 1935, 270–271; Pomeranz & Topik 1999, 72–94).

Although shrouded in myth, many date the arrival of coffee in the New World somewhere between 1714 and 1723. A popular and oft-repeated tale has the first coffee plant in the Americas arriving via a circuitous route. A Yemeni seedling went from Java to the Botanical Garden of Amsterdam. The young tree then went to Louis XIV and the Garden of Plants in Paris before finally completing its world tour by being transported across the Atlantic to French Martinique (Ukers 1935, 3; McCreamy & Bynum 1930, 1). This original father/mother of all American trees supposedly begat all subsequent coffee varieties grown in the Western Hemisphere. In actuality, the dispersal of coffee for cultivation in the Americas was not so neat and tidy as the super-tree scenario. Nevertheless, two primary types of coffee developed in the Americas: C. arabica var. arabica developed by the Dutch and C. arabica var. borbonica propagated by the French. The Dutch variety spread faster as continual experimentation in the Americas, Asia, and Africa led to improvements in yield and increased resistance to disease. Since the beginning of the eighteenth century, this variety has comprised the majority of the world’s premium coffee (Ukers 1935, 735–737).

By 1750, the globalized trade in commodities allowed a shoemaker in Glasgow to drink coffee grown in Indonesia and sweetened with Brazilian sugar, while smoking tobacco from the Virginias. In the 19th century, two major events ensured that coffee, not tea nor hot chocolate, would remain the leading caffeinated beverage for Europe and North America. The first trend that accelerated the demand for coffee was the use of slave labor by the Europeans to lower the cost of production. Slavery in Haiti prior to 1791 and in Brazil until 1888 caused supplies to soar and prices to plummet. Prices dropped from 18 shillings per pound in 1683 to 1 shilling per pound after the American Revolution. Low unit costs, not patriotism post-Boston Tea Party, caused coffee consumption in the U.S. to exceed that of tea by a factor of ten in the early 1800s (Pomeranz & Topik 1999, 92–93). In the early twentieth century, Americans increased their per capita consumption thanks to sexist advertising campaigns that encouraged women to buy good quality coffee so that their husbands would not pour inferior (and scalding) coffee on their wives’ heads. Irrespective of spousal abuse inherent in such sales tactics, the United States consumed half of the world’s coffee throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

The second seismic shift in the globalization of coffee began when an 1870s fungus (Hemileia vastatrix) decreased Asian and African production. Although it did not kill the coffee trees, the fungus did reduce their harvest and lessened profit margins (Clarence-Smith 2003, 102–103). Brazil stepped into the void left by decreased Indonesian and African productivity and increased its coffee farming with a seemingly endless amount of cultivable land. By the beginning of the twentieth century, even after the abolition of slavery...
and the introduction of wage labor, Brazil was the hegemon of the supply side. Yet Brazilian production was cursed by weather. Coffee grows best at higher altitudes; mountain beans grow physically “harder” or more compact than those grown at lower elevations. And the harder the bean, the greater the flavor.

Yet the problem for Brazil was that much of its coffee-growing region was at altitudes prone to frosts. Frequent and catastrophic frosts in southern Brazil caused major disruptions within the international trade of coffee. The unreliability and inaccuracy of weather reporting from Brazil profoundly influenced speculation and facilitated strong movements in the price of traded coffee. Speaking before a U.S. congressional inquiry on the unstable nature of coffee prices at the turn of the twentieth century, one coffee trader noted that on the world market “news from Brazil concerning frost and rainfall or favorable weather while the crops were ripening came to play a great part in the game” of establishing coffee prices (Jacob 1935, 277–280).

The most disruptive frost (“The Black Frost” of July 1975) killed one and a half billion trees, leaving the Economist to write, “the world’s coffee trade…may have been permanently altered. Few of the Paraná coffee bushes will recover” (qtd. in Pendergrast 1999, 317). This grave frost radically changed the trading of coffee throughout the remainder of the 1970s and well into the 1980s. Supply shock caused a dramatic escalation in prices on the major coffee commodity exchanges. By hoarding coffee, worried consumers in the Netherlands increased their supply five-fold. Within the U.S., the New York commissioner of consumer affairs, Elinor Guggenheimer, advocated giving up coffee “cold turkey” rather than pay “scandalous” prices. The MacNeil/Lehrer Report noted with irony “that a nation that started on the road to independence with a tea boycott should be kicking off its third century with a coffee boycott.” The U.S. Congress became so concerned about possible price gouging that it conducted investigations. It took patient explanation from Julius L. Katz, assistant secretary of state, to explain how it was a devastating frost in Brazil that drove up the price of coffee, not a vicious manipulation of the market as alleged by New York Representative Frederick W. Richmond (Singh et al. 1977, 5; Pendergrast 1999, 317–337).

Salvation for the international coffee trade came from an unlikely location: the United States Pacific Northwest. Starbucks Coffee Company began selling freshly roasted C. arabica beans in Seattle on 30 March 1971 and started its rapid expansion in the mid-1980s. Starbucks used only good quality C. arabica beans, and because Brazilian beans were not of high quality, a new generation of consumers was introduced to coffee grown in Costa Rica, Tanzania, and Sumatra. Brazil would continue to dominate the blended coffees sold by Maxwell House, but single-origin beans became part of the consumer culture for the enlightened. Soon, Seattle and Starbucks were synonymous with the new culture. In 1989, Starbucks had thirty-nine retail outlets in the Pacific Northwest and Chicago. The company went public in 1992, and the hit TV show, Frasier (1994) revolved around the title character and his caffeinated brother downing espresso drinks in an Emerald City coffeehouse. In 1996, an April 1st report on National Public Radio (NPR) illustrated the newly upscale and obsessive consumption patterns in the U.S. at the end of the twentieth-century:

Starbucks will soon announce their plans to build a pipeline costing more than a billion dollars, a pipeline thousands of miles long from Seattle to the East Coast, with branches to Boston and New York and Washington, a pipeline that will carry freshly roasted coffee beans. (qtd. in Pendergrast 1999, 378)

Millions of NPR listeners believed the April Fools prank. The Starbucks craze then spread to Europe and Asia. Specialty roasters that sold whole beans (Peet’s, Zabars, and Green Mountain Roasters) also began to acquire market share. Now in the twenty-first century, it has become increasingly common for a computer programmer in Beijing to buy Ethiopian coffee from a U.S. company.

What’s in store for the globalization of coffee in the twentieth-first century? On the demand side, increased sales are forecast within the producing nations themselves. Previously, they exported their best coffee and either drank other beverages—Guatemalans drank hot chocolate as their beverage of choice in the nineteenth century—or consumed watered down and highly sweetened coffee. Westerners have long complained about the poor quality of the beverage served in the producing nations, as evidenced by Guatemalan consumption habits noted in 1887 by traveler writer William T. Brigham:

Here let me speak of the atrocious coffee that we found in this place and elsewhere as we went on. The berry, which is of fine quality, is burned, not roasted, and when pulverized, boiled for hours, and then bottled. This nasty stuff they call esencia de café, and mix it with boiling water at the table. It was generally served to us in patent-medicine bottles, with a corn-cob or a roll of paper as a stopper. It had not the slightest taste of coffee, but reminded one of the smell of a newly-printed newspaper. (84)

Today, Guatemalans are becoming reacquainted with their most valuable foreign export, and quality coffee is served in cafes from Quetzaltenango to Huehuetenango. Brazil is now one of the world’s biggest consumers of coffee. Many other coffee-growing nations, such as Mexico and Kenya, still lag well be-
hind the U.S. and Europe in per capita consumption. However, as the global economy transmits ideas at an accelerating pace, Mexicans and Kenyans are beginning to drink more of their home-grown *C. arabica*. Not surprisingly, the Scandinavian countries, with their long bleak winters, lead the world in per capita consumption. An emerging market for new coffee consumers is China where Starbucks opened a store within the Forbidden City in 2000 and has ambitious expansion plans for the next ten years.

On the supply side, the most serious problem continues to be a chronic condition of over-supply. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, too many countries have produced too much coffee. Because coffee trees take five years to bear their first crop, farmers have no reliable method of predicting future market conditions. Additionally, coffee cultivation tends to be cyclical. When prices are high, growers in all countries tend to plant more trees. As these new trees mature, this newly harvested coffee begins to accumulate in warehouses in Rio, Rotterdam, and New York. Prices begin to fall and farmers rip up old trees. After a few years, brokers perceive a shortage of coffee and the cycle starts all over again. Commenting on the boom-bust nature inherent within the global trade of coffee, one trader wrote:

After the rise the fall,  
After the fall the slump,  
After the bubbly and fat cigar,  
The headache and the hump. (Caceres 1977, 45)

The first attempt to relieve this “headache and hump” occurred in 1902 when twelve Latin American coffee-producing states and the largest coffee consuming nation, the United States, sent delegates to the International Coffee Congress in New York City. The delegates had three options to rectify supply-demand disequilibrium: increase demand, reduce supply, or perform these two actions simultaneously (U.S. Senate 1902, 63). The Latin-American emissaries hoped that the market’s invisible hand would rise up and reinstate a fair price for their country’s coffee growers and processors without any economic sacrifices. However, the first hemispheric coffee conference ended without achieving its primary objective—to equalize the conditions of supply and demand. One delegate furtively warned that overproduction could only be controlled through the combined efforts of the interested governments (Johnson 2002, 78–81).

A second and sustained effort to correct structural deficiencies within the global trade of coffee occurred because of the Cuban Revolution. In order to prevent another Fidel Castro, the United States during the Kennedy administration began to seek ways to lessen the instability associated with Latin America’s commodity trades. Because coffee was Latin America’s leading export, the U.S. went against its long-standing philosophy of interfering in free-trade and entered into a commodity agreement limiting the amount of coffee that each nation could export. From 1961 through 1989, the producing and consuming nations created the International Coffee Agreement (ICA) in an attempt to stabilize coffee prices and allow coffee farmers an opportunity to use their profits from coffee to diversify into other export commodities. Yet the ICA failed to lessen the overproduction of coffee. Instead, Green Revolution technology allowed farmers, or at least those farmers who had access to capital, to use fertilizers to grow more coffee on less land. Diversification failed to occur because large farmers “technified” their coffee farms. Small farmers suffered a double-whammy: the coffee-trade continued to experience boom-bust cycles, and without technification it became almost three-fold less profitable to grow coffee.

In the end, the ICA failed to rectify the structural defects within the global trade in coffee and as the Cold War wound down, the United States withdrew its support in 1989. Without the world’s largest consumer of coffee, the ICA was useless. In the 1990s, Vietnam became a major exporter of coffee, further exacerbating the chronic over-supply. Yet the silver-lining within the globalized trade of coffee was the aforementioned specialty market. The remedy for the producing nations is targeting the high-end market, important because coffee remains the second most valuable, legally-traded commodity. The globalization of coffee can be a remunerative endeavor in a globalized marketplace for the growers if they are given the tools to compete—Green Revolution technology and the funds to purchase this technology.

NOTES

2 Dicum and Luttinger in *The Coffee Book* hold to the Turkish derivation.
3 Ukers states that in either 1720 or 1723, the French Master Mariner Gabriel Mathieu de Clieu carried the first coffee plant to Martinique. This plant supposedly became the “father” of North American coffee. The geographer Jonathan Sauer disagrees and dates the arrival of coffee to French Surinam in 1718.
4 Britain was the notable exception because of its trade and colonies in Asia.
5 See Pendergrast 1999, 266–267, for reproductions of coffee advertisements.
6 Harvard mathematician, Elizabeth Gilboy, wrote: “from the nature of coffee production, it would seem reasonable to expect a cycle of from eight to fourteen years, its length depending on the irregularity in the course of weather and bumper crops” (1934, 675).
WORKS CITED


EZRA POUND’S SEVEN LAKES

I SHALL HAVE TO GO EAST SOME TIME.
—EZRA POUND

1
The traveler squats in the reedy cabin
of a sampan where a lantern flickers
and blows a bamboo flute,
its tune tinkling with frozen rain.

2
Dusk spreading its dark over the lake
like a Chinese ink-splash drawing;
bells tolling in the hills. The traveler
looks, “Where is the temple?”

3
White egrets skating over blue hills;
silver waves pushing over skyline.
A mast goring red sunset disappears into dense reeds—
fishermen go home to drink wine.

4
A yellow wine flag in the afterglow.
The traveler reels toward the temple, reciting Confucius:
“To have friends from far countries is true pleasure!”
A flask in his hand dripping mellowness,
the trail floating before his eyes.

5
Wild geese brush the sky in light black ink,
their formation a Chinese character for Man.
They swoop down on the lakeside,
their feathers trembling like reeds in wind.

6
The jade dust of snow blurs the sky in first dark.
Looking beyond the white lakescape,
the traveler in the sampan murmurs, “Sundown, to rest.”

7
Oars creaking out of reeds—fishermen come back to fish.
Fish and shrimp twitch and leap in nets.
A boy hurries away for wine, for a feast.

8
The traveler sings toward reeds bending in wind:
“The sun and moon shine day and night.”
Tonight, the moon is lanterns
everywhere on the lake.

—JIANQING ZHENG

Jianqing Zheng teaches at Mississippi Valley State University. He is a recipient of the 2004 Mississippi Arts Commission Poetry Fellowship and has published a collection of his poems, The Landscape of Mind (Slapering Hol Press, 2001).
IS NEO-LIBERALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?

NANDINI DEO
YALE UNIVERSITY

With her famous question “Is multi-culturalism bad for women?” Susan Moller Okin sparked a debate on women’s rights in a liberal democracy faced with recognition claims by various cultural and ethnic groups (1999). In a similar vein, I ask if neo-liberal economic policies, emanating from the globalization of the world economy, are bad for women in developing countries? Given the experience with Structural Adjustment Programs in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, it is easy to conclude that neo-liberal economic reforms have an especially adverse effect on women. Cuts in health and education spending force women to assume greater burdens in their roles as reproductive workers. Rising food prices impact women by reducing their caloric intake and by pushing them into the production of cash crops, which in turn puts subsistence agriculture at risk. While classical economists might suggest that eventually the benefits of such measures will trickle down to even the poorest workers, almost the entire cost of the adjustment period is borne by those least well-equipped. How, then, can feminists argue in favor of economic reforms that promote exports, liberalize imports, and lead to greater privatization of service and production industries?

In order to make globalization and economic liberalization work for women, there are two directions feminists can move. The first is to continue critiquing cuts in social spending, and the second is to promote and accelerate the opening of economies to international trade. Labor intensive industries, which are export-oriented, employ women who then can turn their income-generating power into political power and gain greater control over their lives.

Drawing on the experience of East Asian and Southeast Asian economies as they move toward industrialization, this paper shows that for the least-developed countries women’s labor is indispensable. For various reasons, employers in export-processing zones prefer to hire women. And while the international trade regime is patently unfair, it can be managed in ways that are beneficial to poor women. With the growth of the garment industry, agricultural processing, and small scale manufacturing, the female labor force is growing. As women become taxpayers, their needs more likely play in government policy-making and they will be empowered to exit situations of violence and exploitation within the home. As such, neo-liberalism is both good and bad for women.

I begin with a definition of neo-liberal economic reforms and their impact on women as reproducers (biological and social), consumers, and workers. This discussion highlights the areas in which existing policies help or hurt women in the developing world and will serve as the basis for considering macroeconomic policies that are more beneficial to women. I then sketch out the ways in which neo-liberal policies can result in a revival of feminist politics domestically. I extend the discussion to the ways transnational feminist activism affects the policy-making of development and the changes the movement must make in its approach to feminism. The paper concludes by distinguishing between the globalization of economies and neo-liberal orthodoxy to argue that feminists should embrace the former while being careful critics of the latter.

The neo-liberal approach to macroeconomic policy-making seeks to minimize the role of the state in the economy and to expand the sphere of human activity within the marketplace. The policy mix consists of prescriptions for international trade as well as domestic economic reforms. In their economic relations
with the rest of the world, countries are encouraged to dismantle barriers to the import and export of goods and services, float their currency, and court foreign investment flows. Internally, states are advised to guarantee the independence of central banks, reduce spending, lower taxes for businesses, privatize national assets, deregulate labor markets, and remove price supports (UNRISD 2005).

The assumptions behind such prescriptions are that the primary purpose of the state is to act as a “night-watchman,” enforcing contracts and providing security so as to create a free market where entrepreneurs can efficiently deploy their capital and can labor to make economies grow at a brisk pace. This growth will increase consumer purchasing power that, combined with the exploitation of a global division of labor on the basis of comparative advantage, will enable everyone to benefit from a larger pie (World Bank 2001). Few states have actually adopted all of these policies, but over the past two decades, more and more economies have been subject to some of these reforms. To answer how these reforms affect the most vulnerable in developing countries, the differential impact of these policies on men and women must be considered.¹

Feminist critiques of neo-liberal policies rest on the observation that men and women are differently placed in the economy. A gendered division of labor leads to differential impacts of economic changes on men and women (World Bank 2001). In most societies, the work of reproduction (biologically and socially) is women’s work and is the sphere where the differences between men and women in adjusting to economic reforms is most stark. In the developed world, many caring needs are met by institutions such as hospitals, child-care centers, etc. Even these “institutional carers” are staffed primarily by women. Thus, it makes sense to speak of a global division of labor that assigns women to the work of caring for children, the sick, and the old. For poor women in poor countries, this burden includes caring for livestock, gathering fuel, and fetching water.

Case studies from around the world clarify that neo-liberalism is disastrous for women in their roles as caregivers (Sen 1991; Catagay et al. 1995). The withdrawal of state services or their privatization, which leads to fees for service, results in women’s taking on ever greater burdens. When families delay visits to doctors, they turn to their own resources—the women—to make up the shortfall of services, often negatively impacting the care givers and their families with exhaustion and stress.

Cutbacks in state spending on “basic needs” services hurts women. The gains in efficiency (which are dubious) come at the cost of pricing some services out of reach of the poorest families. Corporations, unlike states, respond to shareholders, and therefore they tend to avoid expensive service provisions, such as providing water or electricity to rural areas with low population. Again, the impact is greatest on women (Zammit 2003), especially when health care comes at a cost or medications are expensive due to patent protections. Over time, girls are taken out of school in order to help their mothers cope with increased family burdens and to save money (UNRISD 2005). When seen from the perspective of reproduction and care giving, neo-liberal policies are bad for women.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Reform</th>
<th>Impact on Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Health care co-payments</td>
<td>Delays in seeking medical attention, more time spent caring for sick and old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School fees</td>
<td>Drop in female attendance at school</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utility privatization</td>
<td>Lack of service in outlying areas, more time spent gathering alternatives</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Impact of reforms on women as caregivers.

We have looked at the impact of neo-liberalism on women as consumers of social services. Now we look at them as consumers of the daily necessities of family life. The liberalization of import and export regimes in itself improves life for all women. As low-priced goods from other countries enter the economy, domestic prices drop. Although there are problems associated with this drop, they are not germane to the discussion of consumption patterns. A currency devaluation, however, could make all goods more expensive for women. Women, especially poor women, are the purchasers for the family (Catagay 2001). They are the ones who have to make the difficult micro-decisions of paying for oil or new shoes. Hence, a set of reforms that reduces the price of basic commodities will benefit them as long as the currency is stable.

Because all women are consumers, any change in prices affects them all. At the lower end of the income scale, more of the household income goes toward basic goods such as food and clothing. As such, whatever the fluctuations in prices, they have the greatest impact on the poorest households. At the bottom of the income scale, even a slight increase in prices can be catastrophic, forcing families to turn to loan sharks to get by (Bakker 1994). Shifts in currency values have devastated lives (seen recently in Argentina and before that in the Asian financial crisis). It is increasingly difficult for governments to “manage” their currencies rather than “float” them. When moving from one kind of currency regime to another, policy-makers should be aware that some of the most
vulnerable households will collapse unless some sort of support system is established. From the perspective of women as consumers, neo-liberal policies may be bad for women.

The greatest impact of neo-liberal policy reforms is on women's workload in both the reproductive sphere and the wage-earning sphere. There is no evidence to indicate that greater work responsibility for women outside the home results in less work within the home (Elson 1995). That is, men do not take on household chores when women start working for wages. As such, some of the impact of the policies discussed in this section have implications for the reproductive sphere as well. For the most part, these will be bracketed for the purposes of analytic simplification.

The reforms that affect women as workers are, for the most part, the “globalizing” reforms. Some, such as the deregulation of the labor market, are not necessarily part of globalization but are part of the policies designed to make a country’s production oriented toward the international market. I will return to this distinction between neo-liberalism and globalization.

The set of policies that seek to change the work environment in developing countries are two kinds. The first is the inward flow of capital and the second is the outflow of products. Neo-liberal import policies call for reform by developing countries while export reform actually requires a great deal more of developed countries. Export reforms have met with limited success thus far because of the domestic politics of developed economies. Labor interests and industry lobbying in the developed world have historically limited the exporting ability of developing countries in those products where they enjoy a comparative advantage. These products consist of agricultural commodities, textiles, and leather goods—all of which are heavy employers of women, and all of which require relatively low levels of capital to produce. Through a combination of subsidies to developed-country producers, restricted quotas, and various “standards” for labor, safety, etc., developing countries are prevented from exporting the goods they are most capable of producing for the lowest prices (Williams 2001). Table 3 outlines the reforms that developing countries have pushed to globalize their economies.

Globalizing reforms have two major results: they lead to the creation of more jobs and they make employment in those jobs more insecure. Much discussion considers the “sweatshop” conditions in which many women work; are these jobs better than no jobs at all? (Catagay et al. 1995). The conditions of work are poor, the hours are often long, and the wages low. However, existing studies of women in export industries fail to examine what their alternatives would be (Jha 2003). Many industries subcontract so that women can work at home. Existing labor standards are not enforced and frequently children end up helping their mothers (Jhabvala 2003). In addition to the work they do for wages, women continue to be responsible for all the other household tasks.

The benefit of these jobs is most obviously increased income, sometimes the only source of earnings for a family. Even if it is supplementary, the money from women’s jobs is more likely to be put toward the basic needs of the house (Jahan 2003). Only in the best case scenarios do these jobs enable women to save enough money to purchase housing, pay for major expenses like health care, or repay debts. Export-oriented industries that hire mostly women also tend to hire disproportionately younger women (Kabeer & Mahmud 2004). Because the jobs come without maternity benefits, these women frequently delay getting married. Women who marry at later ages tend to have a much greater say in household decision-making and have fewer children (World Bank 2001). Being the sole, or main, breadwinner also can enhance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Reform</th>
<th>Impact on Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Import liberalization</td>
<td>Lower prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency adjustment</td>
<td>Higher prices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>devaluation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table 2: Impact of reforms on women as consumers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Reform</th>
<th>Impact on Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Export liberalization</td>
<td>More jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(WTO accession, regional free trade pacts)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor market deregulation</td>
<td>Greater job insecurity, informalization of work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI deregulation</td>
<td>More jobs, greater risk of “capital flight,”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>leading to economic crashes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower taxes on business</td>
<td>More jobs, less revenue for social security provisions (pensions, unemployment)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Table 3: Impact of reforms on women workers. |
a woman’s decision-making power (Jahan 2003). In the developing worlds these increased jobs are worth the costs. From the perspective of women as workers, neo-liberal policies are good for women.

The work of Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze suggests that social restrictions on women’s mobility are most limited among the poor (1997). Poor families trade control over women’s movement for increased income. The poorest women, then, are the most likely to take advantage of work outside the home. Simultaneously, export industries tend to have heavily feminized workforces (50 to 90 percent). While many of these jobs are described by liberals in the West as “sweatshop exploitation,” the women who work in these units see them differently (i.e. Kabeer 2004). These jobs give young women a space where they can escape the supervision of their families, an income that often gives them greater decision-making power, and the experience of the wider world that can embolden them to speak up. Most importantly, the increased confidence and self-assurance of these women make them ideal candidates for political activism on their own behalf.

In the 1990s, several studies on women working in export-oriented industries concluded that women actually like working for reasons beyond the increased income (Tiano 1991; Bayes & Kelly 2001). These women feel empowered by their jobs and wrest greater control over their lives from their families. Workers who control their own income, which supplements but does not replace male earnings, are the most empowered in household decision making (Safa 1995). Factory workers are often discouraged from organizing or engaging in collective bargaining; however, many have started unions or have taken control of existing puppet unions to demand better working conditions (Jhabvala 2003).

Young women who gain some measure of independence are primed for feminist activities. They have experienced life before and after the job, they have a sense of themselves as people beyond family roles, and they have the material foundation that makes political discussion and action possible. I do not suggest that these women automatically become feminist crusaders. However, their own life experiences and their relative material wealth make them obvious recruiting candidates for feminism. A feminist activist who helps organize the shared experience of women workers will enable these women to speak for themselves in addressing management and others in their society. At present, feminism as a political ideology remains an elite phenomena in most countries. Tied to real struggles to make women’s lives better, feminism could experience a revival as working-class women make sense of their world through feminist eyes.

The argument I make regarding the possible benefits of some neo-liberal reforms for women and the feminist movement rests on the assumption that the feminist movement has not embraced these possibilities. The latter portion of the paper demonstrates that the global feminist movement has of late moved far from macroeconomic policy-making. In the early years of a “global” feminist movement, there were attempts to integrate economic policy-making with feminism. These attempts led to the development of “women and development,” “women in development,” and “gender and development” paradigms that reformed the approach of development economists. However, even these attempts were resolutely focused on the national economy and ignored the structure of the world economy. With the rapid globalization of economies, it is no longer possible to imagine economic growth without some reference to international factors. This paper will end with a normative turn, arguing that feminists ought to embrace globalization.

Before the first world conference on women in Mexico, development discourse excluded women as agents in economic work and planning (Kabeer 1994). After the conference, the inclusion of women in development discourse began. I start with an examination of how the world conferences have dealt with the issue of women and work because this is the area most likely to reflect the urgent needs of Southern women. If the gross inequities in resources between women are not examined within the development sections of declarations, they will not be mentioned elsewhere.

Mexico 1975 to Nairobi 1985. Economic equity and the eradication of poverty have been part of the declarations coming out of each world conference on women. The conference participants have repeatedly called on national governments to ensure that women’s work is recognized and that they are supported in their economic activities (United Nations 2005). Looking at the period from 1975–1985, there are two features of the declarations that stand out. The first is the shift from talking about women and development to gender and development. The second is the complete focus on national economies. Both of these features have important implications for how women’s economic disempowerment is (mis)understood.

By calling the attention of policy-makers to the productive roles women play, activists tried to include them in the various development projects underway. They did not link this inclusion to the frame (then current at the UN) of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and thus left themselves open to the shift to “gender” and development. While the discovery of gender as a category of analysis expanded the field of women’s studies in the academy, it took away an important category of analysis from activists. Once the exclusion of women from the economy (or at least their
invisibility in it) is declared as the result of gender relations, there is no agent left to rectify its behavior. Men and women are equally products of gender relations that subjugate women, which de-politicizes feminist analysis. This equivalence takes the onus off men to alter their behavior and leaves it to women to change themselves and extant power relations. The language of gender has stayed with us.

The focus on national governments also skirts the issues being raised by developing countries in the context of the NIEO. Holding national governments accountable for the many ways in which they oppress and silence women is necessary; however, in the post-colonial world, national governments themselves have been constrained by histories of colonial economic dependence on metropolitan economies. By the 1970s, the dependence of developing countries on the international financial institutions (IFIs) was obvious to even the casual observer. Delegates ignored this larger context in their official demands for economic justice. Despite these caveats, the issues of working women and women’s access to basic social services formed the bulk of the demands (Feminist Majority Foundation 2005).

The Beijing platform for action calls on the IFIs and the governments to explore the gender impact of structural adjustment programs. By this point, calling for gender reviews of macroeconomic policies seems rather pointless as most feminists already have sufficient evidence to show that SAPs have a negative impact on the poor (UNRISD 2005). Other than this, the mission statement of the Platform for Action reveals the focus on gender relations as unaffected by other forms of power relations.

[The Platform] aims at removing all the obstacles to women’s active participation in all spheres of public and private life through a full and equal share in economic, social, cultural and political decision-making. This means that the principle of shared power and responsibility should be established between women and men at home, in the workplace and in the wider national and international communities. A transformed partnership based on equality between women and men is a condition for people-centered sustainable development. (“Beijing Platform for Action” 2005)

This language suggests that the main obstacle to economic development is the inequity of gender relations. Women are poor because their husbands, fathers, and brothers make them poor. While true that some women are poor because they are denied full access to the public sphere, most are poor for the same reason most men are—they were born poor in a poor country. This fact is not mentioned in the development sections of the Beijing Platform for Action.

Of the forty-thousand women who went to China for the Fourth World Conference on Women, many were from the developing world; and many of these activists understood women’s poverty as a result of multiple factors, some of which can only be remedied at the international level (Deo 2005, 4 & 22). Yet, the declaration at Beijing states:

While the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

It is unclear how a developing country that is crippled by debt payments, denied access to developed country markets, and dealing with a variety of internal problems can guarantee its citizens human rights that include jobs, food security, and civil and political rights. Surely a different approach is called for when making demands on Germany or Benin!

The development and poverty sections of the major declarations on women do not acknowledge the realities of women’s poverty in the global system. In 1975 when the sovereignty principle was ascendant and most policy-makers thought in terms of national economies, this may have been excusable; however, these excuses no longer held in 1995. By the 1990s, the globalization of economic relations was already common sense. For former colonies, their dependence on foreign markets and imports never left room for doubt that economic winds blow globally. All of this was not part of the Beijing documents. So what did the conference achieve?

Beijing affirmed and continued the notion that women’s sexual and reproductive rights are their human rights. (This was the section the U.S. delegation tried to reverse in 2005.) The documents call for gender audits that are meant to reveal the causes of women’s subordination (Charlesworth 1996) in contrast to the general lack of economic opportunity. This is a dubious distinction for a Southern feminist. The areas that are most nationally circumscribed for action are the ones that get articulated and implemented.

What is striking in the evolution of declarations from Mexico to Beijing is the reduction of emphasis on development. However flawed the initial attempts to include women in the development discourse may appear now (Escobar 1994), at least they addressed the major problem of the world’s women. Now, the conference declarations resemble laundry lists of women’s issues with economic concerns occupying less and less of the stage. Reproductive health, sexual rights, and symbolic politics of equal opportunity are now the mainstay of the international discourse on women.
Thus far I have shown that redistributive concerns were replaced by recognition concerns in the years between 1975 and 1995. I will now draw on a case study of the most recent UN Conference—Beijing plus 10 to show how this process occurred. In March 2005, the United Nations held a conference to evaluate the progress of member states toward the goals of the Beijing Platform of Action. A parallel NGO (non-governmental organization) forum drew thousands of activists. Thus far, my analysis has examined the official declarations of the conferences that are shaped by the NGO forum but are inherently less radical in reflecting the views of government delegations. In this case study, I examine the panels and conversations taking place at the NGO forum. There, activists represented their organizations rather than their governments. This alone could have resulted in a broader range of issues discussed and changed the nature of discussions on the issues addressed by the governmental forum. Table 4 shows the relative breakdown of the panels at the NGO forum (“Beijing” 2005).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject of Panels</th>
<th># of Panels</th>
<th>% of Panels</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Violence (domestic and conflict-related)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sexuality &amp; health</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>23.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic needs</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice (perspective of...)</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy (UN, state, NGO)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (regional, psychological)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>99.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: NGO Forum, March 2005

One of the four panels on economic issues was a teach-in on poverty and development held by the Latin-American lobbying group. In another, held by a number of unions, the speaker representing all of Asia was a woman from the tiny island state of Fiji. The remaining two panels actually discussed the impact of economic policy-making at the global level on women, bemoaning the effects of neo-liberal macroeconomic policies on women, children, and the environment. When they were asked how to address the problems created by elite agreements, there was an embarrassed silence. No one had thought of alternatives or even strategies of resistance to what is/was the most important force shaping women’s lives—growing economic interdependence. At the union forum, more time was spent discussing the relative decline in the growth of welfare states among the countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) than the ways in which those countries block the developing world’s workers from exporting their products.

Stylistically and substantively, the discussion was limited by the structure of each of these panels (excluding the teach-in). In order to be globally representative, the organizing NGO, which was North-based, invited a speaker from each continent—“partners” or academics from Africa, Asia, Latin America, Europe, and the USA. The American or European speaker was usually the chair of the discussion while the representatives of the other continents were not specialists in continent-wide activism nor in academic expertise. Thus, a few people spoke on behalf of millions, about whom they knew little; the Northern speakers took the most time and chose audience questions. Each time a panel ended, a group of Southern women was seen whispering in the back.

A Jamaican woman lamented: “We just keep saying the same things each time…what’s the point of seeing the problems if we can’t do anything about them?” Another woman from Colombia asked, “Don’t they know that our governments can’t do anything? The U.S. dictates policy through the [World] Bank and the IMF.” These conversations, taken with the frequent eye-rolling during the sessions, indicate a feeling of dissatisfaction with the nature and direction of the discussions. So why are these thoughts only whispered? Most women from the South attend these conferences with funding from Northern agencies. Resource competition leads NGO activists to smooth out criticisms and voice the appropriate concerns. Resources also determine who hosts the panels and how they are made up. All these constraints conspire to keep Southern women whispering at the back of rooms when issues that matter are under discussion.

The views aired and the subjects raised are those that make sense to Northern feminists. Forums like the WTO meetings, the Davos summits, and the decision-making at the international financial institutions are not gender-sensitive. The UN conferences on women are the major global arenas that welcome women and allow them to speak to one another. This alone makes it critical that the meetings consist of an
honest dialogue of the issues that impact women’s lives in the North and the South. Avoiding the differences among the interests of women with recognition and redistributive concerns ill-serves the women of the world. The reduction of gender-based discrimination cannot happen in the absence of poverty reduction in the South. This requires more than a micro-credit program or a gender audit of government spending. To reduce poverty in the South, feminists in the North must push their politicians to eliminate subsidies to rich farmers and to open their borders to goods from the South.

Returning to the discussion of how particular economic reforms affect women, it is clear that women in their roles as consumers are especially burdened by cuts in state spending. Actions to integrate economies within the world market (preferably within a reformed world market) help women as workers. Although the term neo-liberalism embraces both of these reforms, it is unclear if the term globalization needs to encompass both. I suggest that we can think of the reforms in Table 3 as those most closely tied to the globalization of economies and should be considered separately from those listed in Table 1. These globalizing reforms are actually helpful to the most vulnerable women in developing countries; on the other hand, the neo-liberal domestic policy package severely hurts them.

Feminist activists should embrace globalization and resist neo-liberalism. Activists in the North can best help women in the South by pushing their own states to eliminate barriers to trade. Southern feminists should be shaping trade agreements that are maximally beneficial to women while, at the same time, mobilizing resistance to cuts in state spending. A policy mix that unleashes entrepreneurial spirit while universalizing state support for education, health care, and other basic needs will do the most to help poor women.

NOTES

1 In this paper, women are simplistically conceptualized as a mostly homogenous category except when differentiated by the ways they are impacted by macroeconomic policies. In reality, women are differentiated by class, ethnicity, and other group identities, all of which affect their relative positioning within an economy.

2 The resource disparities between Northern and Southern women far outstrip those between Southern men and Southern women.

WORKS CITED


